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DEMYSTIFYING THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE:
OF PROPERTY, INVIOLABILITY, AND
AUTOMATIC INJUNCTIONS
SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH*
The right to exclude has long been considered a central component
of property. In focusing on the element of exclusion, courts and schol-
ars have paid little attention to what an owner's right to exclude
means and the forms in which this right might manifest itself in ac-
tual property practice. For some time now, the right to exclude has
come to be understood as nothing but an entitlement to injunctive
relief- that whenever an owner successfully establishes title and an
intelference with the same, an injunction will automatically follGIu.
Such a view attributes to the right a distinctively consequentialist
meaning, which calls into question the salience of property outside of
its enforcement context. Yet, in its recent decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.c., the Supreme Court rejected this consequen-
tialist interpretation, declaring unequivocally that the right to ex-
clude did not mean a right to an injunction. This Article argues that
eBay's negative declaration sheds light on 'what the right has really
meant all along-the correlative of a duty imposed on non-owners
(the world at large) to keep away from an ownable resource. This duty
(of exclusion) in turn derives from the norm of inviolability, a defin-
ing feature of social existence, and accoun ts for the primacy of the
right to exclude in property discourses. This understanding is at once
both non-consequentialist and of deep functional relevance to the in-
stitution of property.
• Bigelow Teaching FeJJow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law
School. J.D., Yale Law School; M.rhi!., B.C.L., University of Oxford. Many thanks
to Douglas Baird, William Baude, Josh Bowers, Robin Effron, Richard Epstein, Lee
Fennell, Andrew Gold, James Grimmelmann, Irina Manta, Jonathan Nash, Henry
Smith, Stewart Sterk, and Lior Strahilevitz for helpful comments and suggestion~.
FesponsibiJity for any errors remains vvith the Author.
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"The notion of property ... consists in the right to exclude others from
interference with the more or less free doing with it as one wills."
- Justice Holmes in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.s. I, 19 (1908) (concurring).
"111e power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the
most h"easured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."
-Justice Marshall in Loretto v. Teleprompter Mrl11hattnn CATV
Corp., 458 U.s. 419, 435 (1982).
"[T]he creation of a right [to exclude] is distinct from the provision
of remedies for violations of that right."
- Justice Thomas in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.c., 126 S. Ct.
1837, 1840 (2006).
INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to speak of property in terms of the "right
to exclude"? As a direct consequence of equity's avowed pref-
erence for property (over personal) rights in the grant of exclu-
sionary relief, courts and scholars have developed a view that
identifies property's right to exclude as meaning little more
than an entitlement to injunctive relief against a continuing (or
repeated) interference with a resource. This view attributes to
the right an entirely consequentialist meaning, under which the
right- and indeed all of property -is normatively meaningless
except when sought to be enforced in a court of law. If prop-
erty, as a fundamental social institution, is important outside
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its remedial context, it is important to identify what the right to
exclude means apart from the availability of an injunction. This
Article attempts to do this by locating its meaning in the norm
of inviolability and the obligation it casts on non-owners to
stay away from resources that are owned (and capable of being
owned) by someone else.
In his now-legendary formulation, Blackstone defined prop-
erty as "that sole and despotic dominion ... exercise[d] over
the external things ... in total exclusion of the right of any
other." I Blackstone's definition has since been morphed into a
more general definition of property rights in the abstract, cen-
tered around the in rem right to exclude.2 On numerous occa-
sions, in dealing with the issue of takings, the Supreme Court
too has characterized the element of exclusion as a critical
component of the property ideaP
The idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends to in-
form almost any understanding of property, whether private,
public, or community.4 The only variation tends to be the per-
son or group in whom it is vested. Private property entails
vesting it in an individual; public property, in a government or
other agency on behalf of a wider set of individuals; and com-
munity property, in members of a community against non-
members. Consequently, the tendency among scholars, courts,
1.2 WILLIAM BLACKSTO: E, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF E. GI.AND 2 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1979) (1766) (emphasis added). For elaborations on Blackstone's
definition, see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstolle's Allxiety, 108
YALE L.J. 601 (1998). For analysis of Blackstone's view of property rights, see
Robert P. Burns, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. erN. L.
REV. 67 (1985).
2. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360-64 (2001) (attributing the in re1ll conception of
property to Blackstone and discussing the progression of property law in general).
3. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.s. 419, 435
(1982) (referring to the right to exclude as "one of the most treasured strands" of
the property rights bundle); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.s. 164, 176 (1979)
(characterizing the right to exclude as "one of the most essential sticks"); id. at
179-80 (describing the right to exclude as a "universally held ... fundamental
element" of property); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.s. 374, 384 (1994);
NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.s. 825, 831 (1987).
4. See R1CHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 63 (1985) (noting that the idea of "exclusive possession" is im-
plicit in the basic conception of property); see also JAN G. LAITOS, LAW ot' PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIO : LIMITATIONS 0 GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 5.03[A]
(Supp.2006).
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and legislators to equate conceptions of property with the no-
tion of exclusion remains pervasive.s
Within the exclusionary conception of property, the right-
based variant tends to dominate overwhelmingly. A decade
ago, Thomas Merrill argued that the "right to exclude" remains
the sine qua nOl1 of property.6 The Supreme Court, whenever it
invokes the idea, also speaks in terms of a "right" to exclude?
Although scholarship and judicial dicta over the years have
attempted to understand and apply the exclusionary compo-
nent of the right to exclude, the debate has tended to ignore
altogether the right component.s Why is speaking of property
in terms of a right to exclude unsurprisingly common? Does the
identification of exclusion as a right shed light on its practical
significance (as a remedy), or is it merely a rhetorical epithet
emphasizing its centrality to the discourse (analogous to the
right to life)?
5. For prominent scholarly examples, see J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JuS·nCE 13
(1996) (characterizing property as an open-ended set of privileges bounded by an
exclusionary trespassory right); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71
(1997) (defining property in terms of exclusion); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue 011 Private
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373~74 (1954); Richard A. Epstein, Weak and
Strong Conceptions of Property An Essay in Memory of ]im Harris, in PROPERTIES OF
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 97 (Timothy Endicott et aL cds., 2006);
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Inforlllation Asymmetries a/1d the Rights to Exclude, 104 .1JCH.
L. REV. 1835 (2006).
6. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998) (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (speaking of a
right to exclude in the context of a regulatory taking); United States v. Craft, 535
US. 274, 280, 282 (2002) (right to exclude in the context of a tax dispute); CoIL Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S 666, 667 (1999)
(right to exclude in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Cleveland
v. United States 531 US. 12, 24-25 (2000) (holding that the "right to exclude" may
exist in the context of a state's domain of regulatory sovereignty); supra note 3. Inter-
estingly, in his dissent in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.s. 215
(1918), Jushce Brandeis characterized the right as the "legal right to exclude others"
from enjoying the resource. hI. at 250 (Brandeis, L dissenting) (emphasis added). For
an excellent overview of the Court's emphasis on the right to exclude, see David L.
Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclllde Others from Pril1ate Property: A Fun-
damental Constitutional Righi, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 39 (2000).
8. Sec, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction: Land Use Controls i11 Tie-
houtiall Perspective, in THE TIEBOLT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS I I PUI3I.Jc Leo 'OMICS
IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006); Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion anrl Properly Rules /n the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. 1.. REV. 965 (2004); Henry
E. Smith, E....ell/sioll verSl/S GmwnJ17I1Ct': Two Strategies for Delil1eating Property Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002); J .iar Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusiol117rlj Amcnities ill
Residential COlll1l11ll1il1es, 92 VA L REV. 437 (2006); Strahilevitz, supra ;lote 5.
FocLlsing on the right component of the "right to exclude" is
of more than just theoretical value. This focus carries with it a
deep functional relevance, one that derives from the interplay
between the language of rights and rcmedies.9 For quite some
time, the right to exclude in the context of both tangible and
intangible property has come to be associated with an entitle-
ment to exclusionary (injunctive) relief. Thus, interferences
with an owner's interests are thought to entitle the owner to a
permanent injunction restraining such interferences. The right
to exclude, according to this understanding, is a remedial at-
tribute related to the automatic availability of injunctive relief
for interferences with an owner's use and enjoyment of her
property.
In eBny Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.c. ,10 however, the Supreme
Court effectively unlinked the right to exclude from any enti-
tlement to exclusionary relief. ll In eBay, the Court concluded
that an affirmative finding of validity and infringement did not
automatically entitle a patentee to an injunction against the in-
fringer, and held that the traditional four-factor test used by
courts of equity determined the availability of an injunctionY
Put differently (in property terms), the Court concluded that an
interference with a property interest, even a continuing inter-
est, does not automatically entitle the owner to an injunction.
The owner must still affirmatively establish the inadequacy of
ordinary compensatory remedies. The point was driven home
most forcefully by Justice Kennedy, who observed in his con-
currence that an owner's "right to exclude does not dictate the
remedy for a violation of that right." 13
Almost all analyses of eBay thus far have focused on its im-
pact on patent law (or intellectual property), and have tended
to ignore the relevance of the Court's holding for property law







9. ror an overview of the literature laying out the basic tenets of the debate over
rights and remedies, see Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXfORD J.
LECAL STUD. 1 (2000); Neil MacCormick, Rights, Claims and Remedies, 1 LAW &
PHIL 337 (1982). For an extension of this debate into the realm of constitutional
remedies, see Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1091; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALIc I...J. 87 (1999); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rig/Its/Remedies Split, 88 VA.
I... REV. 1 (2002).
10 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
11. ld. at 1840.
l2. 5c(' id. at 1839-40.
13. ld. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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more generally.I" Although the Court's holding was directed
specifically at patent injunctions, the express basis of its hold-
ing remained the need to subject patent injunctions to the stan-
dard governing "other cases" where injunctions were
granted. 15 By finding the four-factor test to be the correct stan-
dard, the Court implicitly acknowledged its universal applica-
bility to all grants of injunctive relief. Viewed in this light, the
eBay decision concluded that a grant of injunctive relief, re-
gardless of context, could never be automatic or ensue as a
matter of right.
The eBay decision thus calls into question, rather starkly, the
meaning and relevance of the right to exclude, both within the
domain of intellectual property and in the wider subjects of
real and personal property, at least insofar as each remains
premised on the idea of exclusion. If property is no longer
automatically associated with exclusionary relief, is it meaning-
less to continue characterizing the right to exclude as its central
attribute? Taking the functional interpretation of the right to
exclude as a given, some have readily concluded that the eBay
decision heralds the declassification of intellectual property
(specifically, patents) as a species of property strictu sensu, or
that it dilutes the significance of the right to exclude in under-
standing intellectual property, and thus all property.I6
My argument in this Article is very different: I argue that the
eBay Court's unlinking of right and remedy in relation to exc1u-
14. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Patent Inj1lnctions alld the Problem of Uniformity
Cost, J3 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421, 431-39 (2007); Richard B. Klar,
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.c.. Thc Right to Exclude Under United States Patent
Law and the Pllhlic Interest, 27 WHITTIH: L REV. 985, 994-95 (2006); Harold C.
Wegner, Injllnctii'e Relief: A Chanlling Betsy Boomerang, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 156, 166-69 (2006); Gavin D. George, ote, What is Hiding ill the Bushes?
eBay',; Effect on /-{oldout Behavior in Patmt Thickets, 13 MICH. TELECOMM & 1EO-l. L.
REV. 557, 566-69 (2007). Bill sec Thomas L. Casagrande, The Reach of eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.LC.: Not Just for Troll,; and Patents, HOLiSTON LAW., Nov./Dec.
2006, at 10, mlailohlc ot http://wvc\v.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_nov06/page10.htm
(hinting at the possible applicability of cE3m/s holding outside the realm of patent
law to all grants of injunctive relief).
15. cBny, 1265 Ct. at 1841.
] 6. Sec, I'.g, Yixin H. Tang, ]7//' Flltllre of Palcnt Enforcement after eBay v. MercEx-
change, 20 J-IAJ'\'. JL & TECH. 235, 252 (2006) nA]ftcr the eBay ruling, one must ques-
tion whether it is still tenable to call patent rights 'property rights."'); Peter S. Mencll,
77w Property Ri;.:hts Mouc11lcllt\ Elllhmce of Intel/cctual Pro/'erty. Trill' Louc or Doomed Rela-
tion~/np7, (U.C BerkC'lcy Public Len" Research Paper Series, Paper !\Jo. 965083. 20(7),
lIe'ai IlIhle (J I http://papel-s.ssrncom/snJ3/pa pers.dm I a bstract_id=965083.
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J
sion counterintuitively helps to shed light on what the right to
exclude means in the context of intellectual property and prop-
erty more generally, and to illuminate the role it plays in struc-
turing different elements of the governing legal regime. The
right to exclude, I argue, is best understood as a normative de-
vice, which derives from the norm of resource inviolability_
Analogous to the role of promising in contract law, the right to
exclude operates as an analytic tool, which seeks to transplant
the norm of inviolability from morality to law (admitting of
exceptions as circumstances demand).
Part I sets out different interpretations of the right to exclude,
and uses three different theoretical frameworks. Part II then
argues that if property is understood as an institution of sig-
nificance independent of its actual enforcement, the right to
exclude must be understood as a correlative right deriving
from the norm of inviolability. Part II proceeds to show that the
right to exclude can indeed have independent normative trac-
tion regardless of whether it is actually enforced, much like the
performance right in contract law. Understanding the right
along these lines is not only practical; it also explains its linger-
ing persistence in property discourse. Part III focuses on the
interpretation at issue in the eBay case: the exclusionary remedy
variant. Part lILA examines the mechanical availability of in-
junctions in the context of tangible and intellectual property
and the interface between equity courts' discretion and the
status of the right. Part ULB then focuses on the impact of eBay
on this interpretation of the right, and attempts to show that
the eBay decision may be seen as foreshadowing the move to-
wards a theory of efficient infringement or efficient trespass.
The objective of this Article is not to argue that the right to
exclude is all that there is in propertyY Although the idea of
property most certainly consists of more than just exclusion, to
be meaningful it must contain, at a minimum, some element of
exclusion. How such exclusion might manifest itself in prop-
erty theory and practice, then, serves as the focus of the Article.
17. Some have made just such an argument See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 6, at 754
("[PJroperty means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no more
and no less."). Others have argued equally persuasively that the right to exclude
is an "essential but insufficient component" of what property means. See, e.g.,
Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Plitting the Pieces Back Together, 45 AR1Z. L. REV.
371,377 (2003) (offering an "integrated theory of property," of which exclusion is
an essential part).
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Accepting or rejecting the centrality, for property, of the right
to exclude is conditioned upon a basic understanding of what
the right means and entails. This Article is an attempt to further
that very understanding.
1. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RIGHTTO EXCLUDE: A TAXONOMY
Comprehensive philosophical theories on the nature and
function of legal rights have existed for several centuries now. J8
Yet, one finds little to no analysis of the right to exclude in their
exegesis. 19 At the same time, property scholars have tended to
focus almost entirely on the exclusion element, even though
they continue to use the language of rights theorists. 2o Few
have sought to pay close attention to both elements, with the
resul t that the precise meaning of the phrase, in spite of its per-
sistent usage, remains largely obscure. 21 Although some prop-
erty theorists speak of the right as a unitary concept, others use
it to represent a collective set of rights. 22 Ironically, virtually all
property theorists consistently underplay their reasons for
characterizing the situation as giving rise to a right when it is
precisely the study of these reasons that remains the focus of
rights theorists. It is therefore rather surprising that proponents
of the right to exclude tend to neglect altogether the unique in-
terface of their ideas with those of the rights discourse more
generally.
This Part attempts to describe that interface by classifying
possible conceptions of the right to exclude based on their
structural and functional attributes. While a classificatory exer-
18. One of the earliest expositions on the nature of rights in the English-
speaking world was that of Jeremy Bentham. See I--tLA. Hart, Belltham on Legal
Rights, in OXfORD ESSAYS IN JCRISPRUDENCF (Second Series) 171-72 (A.W.I3 Simp-
son ed., 1973). For a history of the development of rights, see ALAN DERSHOWITZ,
RJGJ--JTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF I~IGHT5 (2004). See
also C"'I-U__ WELlMAN, THE PROl.lFERATIO 'OF RIGHTS: MORAL PROCRESS OR EMPTY
RHETORIet (1999).
]9. Bllt see A.M. Honon!', Rights of Exrlllsion tlIzrl f11111/11/1ities Agl1inst Dillesting, 34
TUL L REV 453,460-61 (1960) (distinguishing between real and personal rights in
the context of exclusion).
20. 5,'e, e.g., Merrill, supra notl:.' 6.
21. Sec Strahilevitz, Sllpra note 5, at 1836 ("!Flor all its centrality, in the minds of
cuurts and legal scholars, there is substantial conceptual confusion ahout the na--
ture of the 'right to exclude.''').
22. Scc, eg., Ml'rriJl, ~lIprt7 notl' 6, at 730-31.
cise of this nature may seem irrelevant and largely academic,
given that the common law is structured as a set of events and
responses to them, differentiating one event (for example, in-
fraction of a specific right) from another invariably dictates the
law's response to it. Characterizing something as a right-
absolute or conditional-brings with it certain well-defined le-
gal consequences. 23 Therefore, understanding the basis of such
a characterization helps to shed light on the kind of conse-
quences that do and ought to follow.
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A. Three Models of Analysis
This section sets out three independent conceptual devices .j
that courts and scholars regularly employ in their analyses of J
rights and connected elements (duties, remedies, and so on). i
1. The Right-Privilege Distinction
Perhaps the most important conceptual distinction in analyz-
ing the right to exclude is the right-privilege (also known as the
right-liberty) distinction. Although positivist scholars em-
ployed the distinction early on, Wesley Hohfeld is credited
with laying out the distinction in its most lucid and concrete
terms. Writing near the turn of the twentieth century, Hohfeld
developed a comprehensive scheme for classifying legal con-
cepts in the common law, which he called "jural relations." 24
Relations were thus classified into rights, duties, privileges, no-
rights, powers, immunities, liabilities, and disabilities using
two independent matrices.2" In addition, legal relations were
identified as in personarn (or "paucital") when they involved
23. See RB. Grantham & CLF. Rickett, Property Rights as a Legally Significant
Event, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 717, 717 (2003) nO]nce in existence [property rights] are
themselves a species of event that gives rise to legal rights and duties ....").
24. He did this in two well-known articles: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ 16, 19
(1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, SOIl1t' Fundamental Legal Conceptions]; and Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Le
c
,<;t1! Conceptions as Applied in Judicia! ReasOlling,
26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917). The two articles were combined in book form after his
untimely death: WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEP-
TIONS AS ApPUED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) [here-
inafter HOHFELD, Fu DAivlENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS].
25. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 24, at 30 (laying
out the matrices in some detail). For an application of the several concepts to tort
law, see Albert J. Harno, Tort-Relations, 30 YALE L.J. 145 (1920).
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discrete parties, such as contractual one-to-one connections,26
or as in rem ("multital") when they involved a relation between
an individual and multiple, indeterminate individualsY
Hohfeld characterized property relations as multital, because
they involved the owner interacting with an indeterminate set
of individuals (potential trespassers).28
In Hohfeld's analysis, a right (or a claim) is defined as a
situation that places another individual (or group of individu-
als) under some sort of correlative duty.29 The content of the
right is defined entirely by the content of the correlative duty
(or obligation) that it imposes on another. Hohfeld contrasts his
idea of a right with that of a privilege, which has independent
normative content in that it privileges, or allows its holder to do
certain things, quite independent of others.30 Its correlative is
thus a "no-right," a position that represents the absence of a
right in anyone else to stop the holder's privileged (or allowed)
action. Hohfeld makes the distinction most obvious with the
illustration of landowner X, noting that /IX has a right against Y
that he shall stay off the former's land" and, equivalently, "Y is
under a duty toward X to stay off the place."3l He further ob-
serves in the context of the right-privilege distinction that
"whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should
stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the
land." 32 Later, specifically in the context of property, Hohfeld
makes the distinction even clearer with the example of a hypo-
theticallandowner.33
26. HOI·HTLD, FUNDAMENTAL LECAL CONCEl'TJO. IS, suprn note 24, at 50-53.
27. Secid. at 53-54.
28. Sec Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Analysis of Property Rights, 16 OXFORD]. LEGAL
STUD. 31 (1996) (elaborating on Hohfeld's application of his concepts to property).
29 HOHI'ELD, FUNDAME TAL LECAL CONCFPT10!\,)S, suprn note 24, at 38.
30. ld. at 38-39
31.1d. at 38.
32. M at 39.
33. ld. at 96. Hohfeld observes:
first, A has multital legal rights, or claims, that others, respectively, shall
110/ enter on the land, that they shall not cause physical harm to the land,
etc., such others being under respective correlative legal duties. Second,
A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land,
using the land, harming the land, etc. ... he has privileges of doing on or
to the land what he pleases.
ld
Wllereas a right is brought into question only upon a breach
ot its correlative duty, a privilege offers its holder the opportu-
nity to perform a positive act unfettered by another's claims or
actions. 34 The right-privilege distinction is, then, little more
than a positive-negative distinction. Yet the distinction is of
more than just philosophical relevance. Although it is clear
when the law protects a right-when it imposes a duty on an-
other-it is not readily apparent when the law protects a privi-
lege. If a privilege is understood as the absence of rights in oth-
ers to restrict the privileged action, the negative definition does
little to clarify the circumstances under which an action may be
considered privileged. Consequently, scholars have been quick
to point out that a privilege is not strictly legal in the same
sense as rights (and duties), and therefore sits rather uneasily
in Hohfeld's framework, given that it remains devoid of con-
tent absent specific circumstances:35
Although a right and a privilege in this understanding no
doubt remain distinct, it is important to note that in a vast ma-









34. For more recent attempts to use the distinction in the context of property
and tort law, see Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400
(2007). See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property aloilg the Tort Spectrl/In: Trespass
to Chattels and the AnglO-American Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD
REV. 135 (2006).
35. See Alan R. White, Priuilege,41 MOD. L. REV. 299, 299 (1978) ("What makes
anything a privilege is a particular characteristic of the circumstances in which it
occurs."). Hohfeld's analysis is usually associated with the "bundle of rights"
conception of property - tha t property consists of little more than a bundle of
rights, privileges, and powers. The aforementioned lack of specific content in rela-
tion to the privileges that form part of the bundle led some critics to characterize
the bundle view as a meaningless rhetorical concept. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The
"Bundle of Rights" Pictllre (~r Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 714 (1996).
In recognition of this criticism, and in order to give the idea more normative
traction, some preferred the term "liberty" - rendering the idea circu mstance-
neutral. See Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1129
(1956). But see Albert Kocourek, The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal Concepts,
] 5 ILL L REV. 24, 27-37 (1920) (arguing that Hohfeld's construction contlated
privileges, liberties, and powers). Interestingly, it was Bentham who used the
term "liberty" to denote precisely the same thing well before Hohfeld did. See
Ha rt, supra note 18, at 174. Bentham characterized liberties as "[ r lights existing
from the absence of obligation," to denote their specifically negative structure.
JEREMY BEl THAM, GENERAL VIEW OF A COMPLETE CODE OF LAWS, reprinted in 3
THE WORKS OF JEREVIY BE'\TI [}\ I 181 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962)
(1838); see also JEREMY BE'\THAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRI ClPLES or MOR-
ALS AND LEGISLATION 302 (JH. Burns & H.LA Hart eds., 1970) (1789). Many also
objected that Hohfeld's usages contradicted established linguistic conventions. See
Max Radin, A Restatellzent of HoJifeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1938).
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jority of situations a privilege comes to be protected by a right.
In other words, a privilege becomes capable of being exercised
because of the existence of an overarching right that shadows it
and requires others to abstain from interfering with the privi-
leged area of action.36 This is often referred to as the "shield-
ing" thesis.:F This thesis helps explain why rights and privi-
leges are often conflated and why in a vast majority of
situations privileges continue to derive at least indirect protec-
tion from the law. Privileges thus represent situations where
the law protects behavior by its active non-intelference (or acqui-
escence)-it both does not interfere on its own and additionally
denies others a right to interfere. Even though rights are usu-
ally accompanied by privileges, situations do exist where privi-
leges remain unprotected by rights,38 and it is here that the dis-
tinction begins to assume practical significance.
2. The Two- Tiered Structure of Rights (and Duties)
The second analytic device of relevance for the purpose of
this Article is the two-tiered nature of rights, often referred to
as the distinction between primary and secondary rights (and
duties). Alternatively characterized as the substantive-procedural
or right-remedy distinction, the idea postulates the existence of
a primary right that is brought into existence either volitionally
(that is, contractually) or through the operation of law (tort
law, for example). Upon an infraction of the right, the legal
structure then provides for a secondary right to operationalize
the primary one or remedy its breach.39 Contract law is taken as
paradigmatic of this structure, where the contract gives rise to a
36. St'e H..I.A HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STLDIES IN JGRISPRUDENCE AND Po-
LITICAL TI1t:ol~Y 162, 171 (1982); MATTHEW H KI~AMER H AI., A DEBATE OVER
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 12-13 (1998); John Finnis, Some Professorial
Fallacies about Rights, 4 ADEL. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1972).
37. KRA"v1FJ~ 1-01 AL., supm note 36, at 12.
38. Sec Arthur L. Corbin, Lt'gnl Allnlysis nmi '[t'rl11iIl0/o:\1/, 29 YALE L.J. 163,167-68
(1919).
39. For a lucid elaboration of the concept, SCL' Peter Birks, supra note 9, at 4-5.
For simililr views in early American scholarship, seC' James Barr Ames, Disseisil1 of
Cilnltt'Is, 3 I-L\RV. L REV. 23 (1890); c.c. Langdell, C1assificatiOiI of Ris,llts I1l1d
VVrollf;s, 13 HI\I{\. L. HEV. 537 (1900). l1'ohfeld also spent some time elaborating on
the primar\'-stY()Jld,ny distinctinn. Sec HOHfFI D, FLi",J);\"1ENTAI LECAI. CO",CTP-
lIONS, slllll'a !loll' 24, ill 102 (disagrel'ing \·vith Ames).
set of rights and duties between the contracting parties.411 Upon
breach of the contract's terms, the law then provides the non-
breaching party with the option of bringing an action for the
breach, coupled with remedies for the same. Scholars have
tended to disagree on their characterization of the secondary
right; some call it a right, others a remedy, and yet others a reme-
dial right. 41 All of them, however, refer to the idea that an interfer-
ence with a primary relationship gives rise to a secondary one.
While contract law remains the paradigm of the tiered struc-
ture, problems begin to emerge when one enters the domain of
tort law, for Liability in this area is premised on a primary duty
of care, the existence of which the law determines ex post, upon
an alleged interference with it.42 The primary relationship is
thus determined at the stage of the secondary one. This artifi-
cial construction has resulted in some debate over whether tort
law does embody the two-tiered structure.4] The general view
is that indeed it does, even though the determination often
happens after the conduct, because, in a majority of situations,
the basic contours of the duty remain known ex ante. When driv-
ing a car, for example, the driver knows not to drive carelessly.
The exact origins of the tiered structure remain somewhat
unclear. Although both Blackstone and Austin employed the
primary-secondary framework routinely,'!4 some trace it to the
French philosopher Robert Pothier, who employed it in the
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40. Lord Diplock, who is credited with introducing the concept to doctrinal
analysis by courts, first applied it in the context of contract law. See Brice Dickson,
The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the General Law of Contract, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 441, 448-49 (1989).
41. See Kit Barker, ResclIing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies
are Right, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301, 319 (1998) (advocating the use of "rights" to de-
scribe remedies); Birks, slIpra note 9, at 9 (observing that the term "remedy" re-
mains obscure).
42. See Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHlLOSOPHICAl. FOUNDA-
TIOi 5 OF TORT LAW 31 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); see also Peter Birks, Equity in the
Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 W. AUSTL. L REV. 1 (1996).
43. See Nicholas J McBride, Dllties of Care-Do They Really Leist?, 24 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 417 (2004).
44. See 2 JOH0i ALJSTII ., LECTURES 01\; JURISPRUDENCE 787 (Robert Campbell ed.,
3d ed. 1869); 1 Bl.ACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 117-21.
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context of his exposition of contract law.45 Hohfeld too empha-
sized the distinction in his classification.46
A primary right thus represents a situation where an indi-
vidual is vested with a right, independent of any preceding
relationshipY A secondary right, on the other hand, is always
contingent on the existence of a primary relationship involv-
ing the party asserting the secondary right, and is therefore
conditional.48
3. The Entitlement Framework
In 1972, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed propounded
an independent theory of entitlements-a unified theory of
property and tort-that focused entirely on mechanisms of pro-
tection.49 Whereas Hohfeld had sought to layout individual
jural relations as they existed prior to any court pronounce-
ment, Calabresi and Melamed focused on rules adopted by
courts in "protect[ing]" the entitlemenpo
The entitlement model involves two steps: in the first, the le-
gal system vests the entitlement in someone; in the second, it
adopts one of three rules to protect the entitlement so vested. s1
Calabresi and Melamed focus almost entirelv on the second of
.J
these steps-"second order decisions"-and classify forms of
protection as property rules (when the law protects against in-
voluntary transfers), liability rules (when the law allows invol-
untary transfers), and inalienability (when the law disallows all
transfers).52 Calabresi and Melamed then argue that a host of
considerations- including economic efficiency, distributional
45. Bernard Rudden, Corresponr!ence, 10 OXFORD J. LECAL STUD. 288, 288 (1990).
For more on Pothier's contribution, see Joseph M. Perillo, Rohert J Pothier's Influ-
encc 011 the C0117111011 Law of COllfrnct, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267 (2005).
46. HOHfELD, Fu. DAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, suprn note 24, at ]08-09. In-
deed, HohfeJd seems to hint at the possibility of a tertiary right as well, in situa-
tions where the breach of a primary right gives rise to a secondary right (of en-
forcement), which in turn results in a court decision that gives a party a third right
against the party in breach. Sel.' ir!. at] 08.
47. 51'c Corbin, sUJlrtl note 38, at 171-72.
48. Sec ir!. at 17] ; .Sf'f' also Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Dlltil's, 33 YALE LJ. 501,
5]] (1924) Ihereinilfter Corbin, Rights and Dllties].
49. Cuido Calabrl'si & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rilles, Linhility Rule.-, al/(I
Innlicl1ahllity: Onl' Vif'il' of t!Ie Ca/ITedml, 85 HA[~\l L. REV] 089 (1972)
50 Id. at ]092
51. SCi' id.
52. Id. ilt 1092--93.
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goals, and morality-guide judges' and lawmakers' choice of
rules. 53 Almost all the literature on the Calabresi-Melamed
model has come to view it as focusing almost entirely on the
issue of remedies, whether legal, equitable, or otherwise.54 Ac-
cording to this literature, a property rule is commonly associ-
ated with ex ante injunctive relief, whereas liability protection is
associated with an award of damages ex post.
The Hohfeldian model and the entitlement framework ex-
hibit an interesting reflexive symmetry.55 Hohfeld focuses en-
tirely on the bare structure of conceptions (or entitlements),
and disregards their actual enforcement or vindication.
Calabresi and Melamed, on the other hand, focus entirely on
remedies and disregard the structure and content of individual
entitlements.56 Whereas Hohfeld cautions against the use of
remedies to understand a jural relation, Calabresi and Melamed
exclusively use remedies to understand the functional rele-
vance of an entitlementY
In its focus on the actual mechanisms of protection (that is,
enforcement), the entitlement framework neglects situations
where jural relations (or entitlements) come to be protected not
necessarily by operation of law, but rather with the acquies-
cence and approval of law. The distinction between a right and
a privilege represents just such a situation. The effective exer-
cise of a privilege, unlike a right, requires absolutely no re-
53. Td. at 1093-105
54. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 NYU. L. REV. 1719, 1720
(2004); see also Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property
Rules and Liability Rilles: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 I w. U. L. REV. 267
(2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J.
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 440 (1995).
55. Although in the past, scholars have attempted ta analyze the interaction be-
tween the Calabresi-Melamed and Hohfeldian models, most of the attempts have
involved unpacking the farmer's entitlement structure using Hohfeld's ideas
rather than analyzing how the two actually might complement each other. See,
e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 27 n.14 (1990); Fennell, supra
note 34, at 1406; Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 822 (1993).
56. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 49, at 1090 (''IT]he fundamental thing that
law daes is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled ta prevail.").
57. Ironically, Calabresi and Melamed do not so much as reference Hohfeld's
work, even though they note that their project is aimed at integrating "legal rela-
tionships," a phrase that had formed the focus of Hohfeld's seminal study. See id.
at 1089.
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course to enforcement mechanisms. Privileges of this sort find
no place in the entitlement framework, for they do not invoke
any legal mechanism and therefore are not protected as such.58
The entitlement framework has had the effect of moving the
discussion of rights away from its conceptualist traditions.
Whereas the discussion of rights and duties had hitherto fo-
cused on issues such as the manner in which they vested and
the parties between whom they operated, the entitlement
framework now requires analyses to focus on rights and duties
primarily through the consequences of their breach. This frame-
work thus focuses on understanding the right through the lens
of the remedy. For example, it matters little whether an enti-
tlement has the structural attributes characteristically associ-
ated with ownership for it to be categorized as a property
righP9 All that is needed is that the law protect the entitlement
with a property rule upon an infraction. In this framework, the
right is meaningful only when protected by a specific kind of
remedy. The entitlement framework thus effectively moves the
emphasis in rights-analysis towards remedies. 60
This near-exclusive focus on remedialism attributes to the
law a principally corrective (or restorative) function. Legal
rules become relevant only when they attach consequences to
individuals' actions-as forms of enforcement- but never as
independent sources of values and principles that could guide
their behavior ex ante.6l The enforcement framework thus as-
58. For an elaboration of the problem in the context of the owner's remedy of
self-help (a use-privilege), see Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Natllre of Property,
1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 69 (2005) (attributing some of these problems to the over-
extensive use of symmetry in economic understandings of property).
59. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 379-83 (noting how the Calabresi-
Melamed framework contributed to the demise of the traditional understanding
of property as an //1 rem right). For more on the move in the economic analysis
towards remedialism, see Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of
Legal Rislzts, 95 YAI.E L.J. 1335, 1339 (1986).
60. See Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 YALE L.J.
2083, 2083-84 (1997) (emphasizing how the entitlement framework has shifted
legal analysis in the direction of remedies).
61. For a comprehensive critique of the entitlement framework's emphasis on
enforcement and its neglect of the "guidance" function, see Dale A. Nance, Guid-
ancc Rules and Enforcemellt Rules: A Better Vif,{J of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837
(1997). See gellernill{ Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rides and Conduct Rules: 011 Acoustic
Separation in Cnllulllll Law, 97 BAHV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (using the same distinction
bet\vcen rules consciously directed at individuals and those directed at officials,
in the context of criminal law).
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sumes that the law comes into play only during acts of recalci-
trance (for example, breaches of contract or violations of the
duty of care), but never influences behavior independent of its
enforcement function. 62 It thereby ignores the fact that legal
rules do elicit compliance and cooperation, most often out of a
belief in the legitimacy and fairness of legal authority and not
merely in contemplation of remedial consequences, such as
sanctions. 63 Legal rules can be meaningful well before their
breach is contemplated.
B. Possible Formulations of the Right to Exclude
Applying these three analytic devices to the right to exclude
provides us with four possible conceptions of the right. The
first two remain distinctly non-remedial and involve the claim-
right and the privilege-liberty. The remaining two adopt a re-
medial approach to the right and build on the entitlement
framework. The four versions together are: (1) the claim-right
to exclude; (2) the privilege-right to exclude; (3) the right to
vindicate one's ownership through enforcement; and (4) the
right to an exclusionary remedy. Each is described in more
detail below.
Table 1: A Conceptual Taxonomy of the Right to Exclude
~e Content Example Potential
Drawback
Conception
Defined by the Patent law's Content dependent
Claim-Right correlative duty (of "right to ex- on independent
non-interference) elude" nonllative source
imposed on others 35 USc.
§ 154(a)(l)
62. Nance, supra note 61, at 858-69.
63. Indeed, the ideal formed the driving force behind much of legal positivism.
Hart famously characterized this idea as the "critical reflexive attitude" of indi-
viduals in society. H.L.A. HART, THE COi\JCEPT OF LAW 56,88 (1961). Set: also infra
Part II.A.2 for an elaboration of this idea.
Attempts to derive a moral explanation for the institution of
private property abound in the literature, and the attempt here
certainly is not to add to that debate.t'8 Most moral construc-
tions attempt to develop an explanatory theory for property so
as to justify its continued existence as an institution of inde-
pendent significance. In referring to the norms of morality sUr-
rounding the institution of property, the emphasis here is
merely on establishing that the right to exclude can be under-
stood independent of the enforcement structures that give it
operative content, because property as an institution has extra-
legal (or social) elements that influence it and give it structure.
As noted earlier, the correlative right is defined by its placing
others (in rem or the world at large) under a duty to exclude
themselves from the object over which the right is to operate.89
The right is thus defined entirely by its imposition of correla-
tive duties on others.90 What, then, are the origins of such a
right and its correlative duty?
Scholars have long noted that the principle of inviolability
remains one of the most basic elements of social existence.'l) In-
violability refers to the idea that certain entities (things and
persons) are considered off-limits, by default, to everyone. The
default position is then lifted or relaxed when specific social
circumstances allow for it (for example, consent or an acquisi-
tion). Sociologists and anthropologists have long argued that
the idea remains basic to all cultures, at all points in history,
albeit to differing degrees and extents.92 Anthropologists often
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88. For some recent work in the area, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007); Carol M. Rose, The
Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897 (2007); Emily Sherwin, Three
Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1927 (2007). For previous attempts to ground the notion of property in ideals
of justice and morality, see J.W. HARRfS, PROPERTY & JUSTICE (1996); JEREMY WAL-
DRON/ THE RIGHT TO PRJVATE PROPERTY (1988); David Lametti, The COl/cept of
Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth/53 U. TORONTO L.]. 325 (2003).
89. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
90. HOHFELD, FUNDA,\IIE TAL LECAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24, at 96.
91. See Lawrence K. Frank, The Cow-ept of ilzviolability ill Culture, 36 AM. J. SOc.
607 (1931).
92. See, e.g., id. at 614-15. Frank notes:
[A] careful, detailed exposition of the concept of inviolability, in its
multitudinous ramifications and implications, will provide at once a basic
scheme for the study of comparative culture, comparative law, and
indeed all the social studies and a peculiarly significant program for
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associate the idea of inviolability with the notion of taboo-a
socially constructed meaning system whereby certain acts are
proscribed.93 Many seek to explain the idea biologica1Jy.94
The two most obvious and prominent areas where inviolabil-
ity manifests itself in human behavior are in relation to persons
and things. The inviolability of the person marks a basic tenet
of social life, but is not directly relevant here.95 The inviolability
of things, however, remains equally well entrenched.
In relation to physical objects (as opposed to persons), the
norm of inviolability requires individuals to stay away from
things unless, through some socially accepted practice (such as
first possession, or consumption), they have a legitimate claim
over them. In other words, inviolability requires that unless
object X belongs to A, A stays away from X. It thus establishes
affirmatively a default posHion of staying away from things
over which individuals actually or putatively do not have le-
gitimate claims. Its importance is best seen through the coun-
terfactual. In the absence of a norm of inviolability, individuals
encountering objects around them would find little to prevent
them from physically (or otherwise) appropriating an object
that they need or desire. For example, A would not stay away
from X unless A knew and was convinced of B's (or someone
else's) claim over X. The default would therefore point in the
other direction: do not stay away from X unless you are made
investigating the development of personality as it arises in and through
the impact of culture upon the individual.
Iii.
93. For an elaboration of the "taboo" concept at the interface of law and anthro-
pology, see Lawrence K. Frank, Ail Institutionlll Anillysis of tl7e Lllw, 24 COl.UM. L
REV. 480, 481 (1924) (,,[Elverything used or useful in Jiving which has been ap-
propriated by someone, or has come from something appropriated, is taboo to all
others. ."). Caution, however, needs to be exercised in taking the argument to
its logical conclusion. Some have used anthropological studies to conclude that,
because taboos connotl' J i ttle more than consequences tha t a ttach to certain pro-
scribed activities, they remain indl'pendently meaningless. Sce Alf Ross, TlI-Ti), 70
BARV. L REV 812,819 (1957) (noting how the rules of ovmership are capable of
being expressed without actual use of the word). Yet, for our purpose, the rules'
ability to influence behavior in this way is precisely a recognition of their norma-
tive content.
94. See Frank, supm note 91, at 614.
95 51'1', c.S., RONALD DWORKli", LIFE'S DOMIl\'IO: : AN ARGUMEN1 ABOUT ABOR-
TlO,', EUTHAi"ASIA, A if.) ]i\:DIVlDUAl. Fl,FFDOM 84 (1993) (offering an investment-
based theory as justification tor the inviolability of the person). For an elaborate
critique of Dworkin's theory, set' J-{ichard Stith, 011 Death and Dworkin: A Critique
of /-II.C; TlIl'on; of 111l'io/n/Ji/ify, e:,6 Mil. I.. RF\' 2S9 (1997).
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to do so. Inviolability thus establishes the norm that, where an
individual does not have a legitimate claim to a resource, he
presumes that someone else has a legitimate claim, and stays
away from that resource.
2. Inviolability in Practice
Morality is concerned with the ways in which people lead
their lives and how they treat and interact with each other-
often moving from the descriptive (the "is") to the prescriptive
(the "ought ll ).96 In the process, morality sets certain ground
rules-rules that may, of course, come to be modified through
legal processes. This process is precisely how the norm of in-
violability operates. It sets a default rule of noninterference,
subject to alteration through specific avenues in both law and
morality.
As a moral norm, inviolability is inward looking. Rather than
relying on sanction or enforcement for its continued validity,
its operation may be understood in terms of what H.L.A. Hart
called the lIinternal point[] of view."97 Writing in opposition to
the views of consequentialists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes,
who believed that obligations and duties were to be under-
stood exclusively through the liability structure that they im-
posed on the holder, Hart argued that rules-and the duties
and obligations that they imposed-come to be followed be-
cause individuals who are subject to them accept them as
II guides to conduct."98 Acceptance does not necessarily imply a
belief in the moral legitimacy of the rule, but merely indicates a
readiness to view oneself as bound by it. The reasons could be
rudimentary convenience, social mores, efficiency, and the like.99
96. For a detailed analysis of the "is-ought" distinction that remains central to
moral philosophy, see Alan Gewirth, The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved, 47 PROC. &
ADDRESSES AM. PHIL ASS'N 34 (1973).
97 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994).
98. ld.; see also Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View 7, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV 1157 (2006).
99. Shapiro, supra note 98, at 1161-62; see also John CP. Goldberg & Benjamin C
Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal
Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2006); Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the
Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171
(2006); Benjamin C Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2006).
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Propertizing a resource and vesting someone with owner-
ship over it conveys to the world a message of resource invio-
lability. That message, in turn, is understood as placing indi-
viduals under an obligation (or duty) to keep away from the
resource by default, unless some other exception necessitates
doing otherwise. Inviolability thus serves as a behavioral guide
to individuals whereby they regulate their conduct in a certain
way so as to accommodate it. The right to exclude is little more
than the correlative of this obligation that inviolability casts on
individuals.
The primacy of inviolability as a default norm is more than
apparent in the context of property. James Penner, for instance,
in his theory of property structured around the primacy of ob-
jects, notes that individuals automatically tend to refrain from
interfering with objects they see around them without inquir-
ing into the identity of an object's owner. lOO Referring to it as
the "duty of non-interference," he notes that the relation is
"mediated via the things the owner owns."101 Indeed, when we
walk down a street lined with parked cars, we do not make it a
point to try opening the doors of the parked cars, even though
we almost never know who the cars are owned by. We auto-
matically, and by default, stay away. The moral norm of invio-
lability explains such behavior. lo2
Allusions to the moral idea of inviolability run through sev-
eral well-known historical exegeses of property-most notably,
those of Grotius and Pufendorf.l 03 Grotius argues that interfer-
ences with owned resources produce an injustice analogous to
affronts on a person's life, limbs, and liberty.lo4 He thus uses the
idea of suum ("one's own") to connect a person's self with his
100. PENNER, supra note 5, at 128.
101. Jrf.
102. Merrill and Smith refer to this duty as the "dut[y] of abstention." Merrill &
Smith, supra note 88, at 1852. They go on to note in the context of a similar exam-
ple involving cars that "virtually everyone must recognize and consider them-
selves bound by general duties not to intertere with autos that they know are
owned by some anonymous other." Id. at 1854.
103 Set' Mossoff, supra note 17, at 379-85 (offering a more detailed analysis of
Crotius and Pufendorf).
104.2 HUGO GROTIU'), DE]LRE BELLI i\C PACI') LIBRJ TRES 53~54 (Francis W. Kel-
sev trans., 1925) (1625).
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resources. Ill:; Crotius's explanation is nothing more than a ref-
erence to inviolability and the contiguity of the idea in the con-
text of bodily integrity and resource ownership. lOb Pufendorf
similarly emphasizes that an act of acquisition ("seizure") pro-
duces a "moral effect" that is the "obligation on the part of oth-
ers to refrain from a thing."tO? This is a much more direct refer-
ence to the norm of inviolability.
The precise strength of the norm tends to vary across re-
source and context. If walking across someone's front yard re-
mains unambiguously objectionable behavior, touching some-
one's parked bicycle while walking along the street certainly
does not seem as problematic. Similarly, touching someone's
handbag may seem less problematic in a crowded train than in
all. open field. Yet in each case the resource is clearly owned by
someone else and forms private property. Much of the varia-
tion depends on social custom. Interestingly enough, it must be
noted that the law often contributes to this variation in the norm
of inviolability. The variance explains the divergence between
realty and chattels on issues of trespass, the ease with which the
law readily presumes an abandonment of ownership, IDS and
those situations in which courts allow other values to trump the
right to exclude.109
105. See STEPHEt BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW .\10 THE THEORY OF PROPERTY:
GROTIUS TO HUME 29 (1991) (explaining Grotius's idea of SUllll/ and its use in the
context of property and inviolability).
106. It is worth cautioning against the sf'cmingly intuitive argument that be-
cause inviolability persists in both contexts, either (1) body parts are ownable
resources or (2) that resources are mere extensions of one's body. See J.W. Harris,
Who OWI1S My Body, 16 OXFORD J. LECAL SleD. SS (1996); Stephen R. Munzer, Kant
and Property Rights ill Body Parts, 6 CAN J L & JURISPRUDEI 'CE 319 (1993). This
contiguity has formed the basis of the argument that property is nothing more
than a logical extension of the control individuals exert over their bodies. St'e
Samual C. Wheeler III, Natural Property R1Slits (/5 Body RigiIts, 14 Nous 171 (1980).
107.2 SAMUEL PUFE DORF, DE JURE N.i\ rURAE FT GENTlUM LIBRI OCTO 547 (C.H.
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688).
108. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 504 cmt. a (1944) (noting how an easement
can be readily abandoned); THOMAS W Mr:RIW.L & HENRY E. SMlTH, PROPERTY:
PRfNClPLES A 0 POLICIES 518-21 (2007) (noting how real property cannot be
abandoned).
109. Thus, situations in which free spel'ch considerations or health and safety
concerns preclude an owner from commencing an action for trespass may, in this
framework, be interpreted as situations in which other values trump the norm of
inviolability, contextually. The strength of the norm varies not just across re-
source, but also across context. See PruneYard Shopping Or. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.). 1971).
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The norm of inviolability may have had its origins in rudi-
mentary convenience, associated with abjectly rival resources.
Yet over time, it seems to have developed into a complex de-
vice to coordinate human behavior across a vast array of re-
sources, often in situations lacking such obvious convenience.
Thus, we still hesitate to set foot on a stranger's land to get to
the other side of the road, even when doing so is obviously
convenient and of little harm to the owner-a hesitation that
represents a clear inefficiency in the short term. Such behavior
reflects how deeply entrenched the idea of inviolability is.no
3. Inviolability Manifested Through the Right to Exclude
If the primary right conception does indeed derive norma-
tive value from the moral notion of inviolability, it raises an
important question. Why is inviolability best reflected in a right
rather than a duty (the right to exclude)? Because, as a norm, it
remains directed at individuals and attempts to modify their
behavior, logic seems to dictate that inviolability operate as a
duty (of excluding oneself from certain objects) rather than a
right. Why, then, do we not speak of the duty of exclusion as
being the most important element of property? The answer de-
rives from the nature of the (right-duty) correlativity in ques-
tion and the distinction between relations in rem (multital) and
those in personam (paucital). Multital (or ill rem) relations lack
the basic symmetry of their paucital counterparts, which is a
point that becomes crucial for our understanding of the right to
exclude. If A has a claim against B for money, A has a right
against B, and B owes a duty (to repay) to A. Defining the rela-
tionship either in terms of A's right or B's duty makes little
normative difference. lJl When we move to multital relations,
however, the distinction between multital rights and multi tal
duties begins to assume relevance. A multital duty (or in rem
duty) represents a situation in which an individual is under a
duty (affirmative or negative) owed to an indefinite class of
individuals. The duty of care, central to tort law, represents just
11 D. Set', e.g., Jacque v Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 NW.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (hold-
ing an intentional trespasser liable for punitive damages of $100,000 even though
the jury had found the actual damage to plaintiff's property to be nominal and
awarded a sum of $1).
111. Sec HOJ lF11 D, FL:\.DAi\1ENTAL LECAL CONCEPTIO'\JS, supra note 24, at 73
(noting that the relationship can be viewed from "different angles").
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such a situation. X driving his car down the road owes a duty
(to drive carefully) to anyone likely to be in the vicinity. For
analytical convenience, one might argue that this duty results
in anyone actually or potentially in X's vicinity being vested
with a "right" against X To define the relationship along these
lines, however, would detract from the intended point of nor-
mative emphasis in the law, which is X and his actions. 112 We
remain concerned with X's actions (and the harm they cause)
and hence understand the relationship in terms of X's duty.
Accordingly, the language of tort law focuses on a "duty of
care" instead of a "right to be cared for."
In analogous terms, the right to exclude is a multital right
that operates against an indefinite set of individuals by placing
them under an obligation of exclusion, Focusing on the duty of
exclusion instead of the right to exclude would make sense,
along the lines of tort law, if our emphasis were on the conse-
quences of a breach of this duty.113 VVe speak of a right to ex-
clude, rather than a duty precisely because our focus is on the
internal nature of property ownership and on the association
between the right-holder and the resource, A duty-based con-
ception would make perfect sense were the focus of the inquiry
entirely on a liability structure and on events triggering liabil-
ity.ll" By focusing instead on the right and its holder, the idea
serves a coordination function: one of denoting that the holder
of the right is responsible for it in more ways than one. This
coordination function, in turn, assumes major relevance for a
vast majority of resources that are by their nature both rival
and exclusive. Whereas a duty analysis would not be focused
on the moral basis for the duty (but rather entirely on the legal
Ill. Indeed, some might even argue that this typifies the situation where a duty
exists without a correlative right altogether. See MARKBY, supra note 67, at 90-91,
113, For an overview of the evolution of the duty of care in tort law, see W,
PACE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETOl ' ON THE LAW OF TORTS 357 (5th ed,
1984) (noting how the idea developed as negligence began to become an inde-
pendent basis of liability in order to establish a causal connection between the
plaintiff and the defendant),
1] 4, In this sense, associating the right to exclude with an action for trespass
remains problematic Although trespass law does build on the basic notion that
property entails the right to exclude, it certainly does not provide an owner with
the right to exclude, Trespass is concerned directly with the duty of exclusion
because its focus remains on liability. See Strahilevitz, supra note 5, at 1836 (noting
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consequences of the breach), the right to exclude remains in-
ward-looking and focuses on its origins and the distinctively so-
cial role of the institution of property as a coordination device.
Inviolability thus remains a normative ideal that is best cap-
tured by the right to exclude. It remains at once both forward-
looking, in being capable of representation as a correlative
duty, which when breached gives rise to liability (that is, the
law of trespass), and yet deeply grounded in the connection
between an individual and an object that is central to prop-
erty's role as a coordination device. Understood in this way, the
right to exclude begins to assume significance outside the con-
text of enforcement. One sees why it is indeed the sine qua non of
property, for it remains a manifestation of the norm of inviolabil-
ity, on which the entire institution of property is centered.
4. Simulations and Extensions: Intangibles
As noted earlier, the norm of inviolability tends to operate
differently depending on the resource in question. Intangible
resources such as knowledge and information tend to be defined
by two criteria: non-rivalrousness and non-excludability.ll5 A
resource is said to be non-rivalrous when its use by one person
does not interfere with its use by another (or in other words,
when such additional use entails no marginal cost) and non-
excludable when it cannot easily be controlled in such a way as
to exclude others from using it.l 1b Tangible resources, most no-
tably chattels, are both perfectly rival and excludable. Intangibles,
by contrast, are perfectly non-rival and often non-excludable. The
subject matter of intellectual property rights-ideas and expres-
sion-are perfectly non-rival and non-excludable.
It is only logical that as the rivalrousness and excludability of
a resource decline, so too does the strength of the norm of in-
violability that attaches to it. Consequently, for resources that
are both non-rivalrous and non-excludable, the norm of invio-
lability is practically nonexistent. Informational property and
intel1ectual property are thus characterized by low levels of in-
trinsic inviolability.
115.5('1' Joseph F. Stiglitz, Knmu!cdgl' n;; n Clnbnl [Jnblic Good, in GLOBAL PLRI.IC
GOODS: I~'II:-:J,'\ATI()'-j/\LOXWfIU\ nO;\ 1;\1 THE 21ST CFNTLRY 30R (1999).
1111. lti at 3lJ8-]()
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To compensate for this-and to thereby imbue the intangible
resource in question with a genuine property-like character-
the law artificially envelopes the resource in question with the
element of inviolability. Thus, when the United States Code
describes a patent as granting its holder the "right to exclude
others" from making, using, or selling the protected subject
matter,117 it ought to be understood as doing little more than
stipulating that others are placed under a correlative duty to
exclude themselves from performing those activities in relation
to the identified resource. It is not a reference to a remedial con-
sequence because the statute does not use the phrase in its dis-
cussion of remedial options available to a court, but does so only
in its discussion of the grant. 118 This is most certainly then a ref-
erence to the primary substantive right and not the secondary.
When we move from patent to copyright, things begin to
change. Unlike patent rights that can be infringed without any
actual imitation (that is, by simply doing one of the acts the ex-
clusive right to which is vested in the patent owner), liability in
copyright is contingent on a showing of actual copying, with
independent creation being a complete defense. 1l9 It is not sur-
prising that the law consciously avoids referring to copyright
in terms of the right to exclude as it does for patents. l2O Inviola-
bility for expressions remains significantly attenuated. Justice
Holmes's analysis of the right to exclude in the context of copy-
right best expresses this difference:
[I]n copyright property has reached a more abstract expres-
sion. The right to exclude is not directed to an object in pos-
session or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the
spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing
117.35 USc. § 154(a)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
118. See 35 USc. §§ 283-84 (2005).
119. For more on this distinction, see Mark A. Lemley, Shottld Patent Infringe-
ment Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007); Samson Vermunt,
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV 475
(2006); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L.
REV. 465 (2004).
120. See generally Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating En-
titlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1800 (2007) (observing how copyright
law tends to place less reliance on exclusion than patent law and is thus less
"property-like"). But see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The
owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and
content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his
property.").
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of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a pro-
hibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of
the party having the right. l2l
Inviolabili ty in the context of copyright is largely a fiction.
Understood in this way, the use of the right to exclude in the
patent statute begins to appear logical and deeply functional.
Given that intellectual property statutes seek to mimic the at-
tributes of tangible property in more ways than one, the man-
ner in which they do (or do not) invoke the right to exclude in
some way signifies the extent of their property-ness.
B. The Analogy to Contract's Performance Right
The right to exclude in property law closely resembles the
idea of a contractual performance right. Both remain ideals
around which entire institutions are structured (and under-
stood) and yet, if they were understood entirely through their
remedial context, they would become divested of their norma-
tive significance.
Of the various primary rights that Hohfeld identified in his
discussion, contractual rights find repeated mention,122 estab-
lishing a right-duty relationship between two or more indi-
viduals. In the ordinary bilateral contract between A and B,
where A agrees to do something in return for B paying him a
fixed sum of money, A has a duty to perform his end of the
bargain, the correlative of which is a right to the performance
vested in B. Conversely, B has a duty to make payment to A,
and A is vested with the correlative right to obtain such pay-
rnent. 123 The critical point to remember for our purposes is that
this analysis of rights and duties is independent of whether
they may actually be enforced as such. In other words, A and B
have these rights and duties regardless of their enforceability in
a court of law, which would involve secondary rights and
claims.12~
121. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.s. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes,
]., conCll rring).
122. Sec. c.g., I-lOI1FELD, FL:\iDAMENTAL LFC,\L CONCFPTJO S, ~lIpm note 24, at
73,108,110.
123. Id. at 41-42
124. Id. at 110 (noting hovv d primary right in perSP111i1l1 may be enforced through
a proce~'ding 1)/IIJ"i i11 rcm).
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[n exhorting the separation of the primary right from its re-
medial counterpart, Hohfeld glossed over a rather fundamental
question, one that has puzzled moral philosophers for ages. In
the absence of all. enforcement mechanism (that is, a secondary
right), why would individuals bother performing their duties?
In other words, if the viability of the primary right is predi-
cated on the existence of a secondary right, then its normative
independence becomes meaningless. 125 But if it remains dis-
tinct why do we have reason to assume continued adherence
to contracts? Thus, in the example above, Hohfeld would seem-
ingly argue that A's duty to B (and vice-versa) arises independ-
ent of B's ability (or A's in the converse) to enforce the same in
a court of law. Now, if A knows this ex ante-that is, that his
duty to B is normatively independent of B's ability to enforce
it- why does A still adhere to his contractual duty? The answer
seems to lie in the morality of promising.
1. The Contractual Right of Performance as a Moral Right
Under a promissory theory, contract law is viewed as a set of
legal rules structured around the norms of morality associated
with the institution of promising. 126 Under the law, contracts
are generally understood as "promise[s] ... for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty."127 Promising thus
forms the foundation of contract-or, put another way, its
moral counterpart. The promise, in this conception, is a mani-
festation of individual moral agency, used to give effect to the
ideal of trust. 128 It is a moral commitment as to a future act, one
that allows the person to whom it is made (the promisee) to
125. It is not readily apparent that Hohfeld was advocating for its complete in-
dependence; his analysis seems to be restricted to arguing that the nature and
character of the primary right were to be understood independent of the nature
and character of the secondary right that comes into play to enforce the former.
See id. at 102.
126. The most prominent promise-based theory of contract law is, arguably, that
of Charles Fried. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIGATIO Cl 981). For other prominent works, see Morris R. Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 Hi\RV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promise;;: An Exal/lination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261
(1980).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
128. See FRIED, supra note 126, at 16 ("The obligation to keep a promise is grounded
not in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust.").
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convert his hope into an expectation. Contract law, then, re-
mains nothing more than a set of legal rules directed at giving
effect to the norms surrounding the institution of promising.
The body of literature attempting to so situate contract
within the skein of promising has grown rapidly over the last
several decades. To be sure, it has its skeptics as well-most
notably utilitarians, who use divergences between contract
law and promissory norms (most common in the context of
remedies) to argue instead that contract law reflects little
more than considerations of transactional efficiency.129 Still,
the promissory view of contract law remains one of the most
dominant in the literatureYu
In accordance with the promissory understanding, contrac-
tual obligations to perform a bargain derive from the moral
norms associated with promising. To speak of a promisee's
"right of performance" is a reference to a correlative (or pri-
mary) right vested in the promisee, consisting entirely of the
promisor's duty to perform. In turn, the promisor's duty to
perform derives not from any recourse to sanction (for that
would entail secondary obligations) but rather from the institu-
tion of promising, on which contract law is premised. The un-
derstanding of the contractual primary right as the correlative
of a duty to perform tracks the view of contract as a set of mu-
tual promises. Individuals perform their primary duties to one
another, independent of the remedial consequences of nonper-
formance, because the ideal of adhering to one's commitments
derives from norms of morality-norms that influence behav-
129. For some of the nonutilitarian criticisms of the promissory theory, sec p.s.
ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, A1 0 L.AW (1981); DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE: TO
CO\:TRACT: TOWAIWS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CO. TRACT (2003); Richard Craswell,
Contract Law, Default Rules, ami the Philosophy of Promisins, 88 MICH. L.. REV. 489
(1989).
130. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L.. REV 708, 721 (2007). As Shiffrin notes:
In U.s. la\"", promises are embedded within contracts and form thl'ir
basis.... The language of promises, promisees, and promisors saturates
contract Jaw-in decisions, statutes, and the Restatement. It also pernwates
the academic literature through its common characterization of contracts
as the law of enforceable promises and by its formulation of lhe
foundational questions of contract as which promises to enforce, "vhv,
and how.
Id
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ior and deter certain kinds of actions, independent of legal
sanction. 131
This moral or promissory understanding of the performance
right allows one to make perfect sense of the law's reluctance to
order performance of a contractual obligation by default upon
a breach. Locating the meaning of the right in contract law's
moral substructure avoids the need to deny the very existence
of any right to actual performance.
2. Enforcing the Promise: The Specific Performance Riddle
While promissory theories of contract law continue to domi-
nate the landscape, one major anomaly within contract doctrine
that such theories often struggle to account for is the area of
contractual remedies. 132 Not surprisingly, this area has also
given utilitarian theorists their strongest argument against the
promissory basis of contractualliability.I.D
In spite of all else, contract law to this day recognizes mone-
tary relief (damages) as the default remedy for breach and spe-
cific performance to be the clear exception, available only in
extraordinary cases where monetary damages are inade-
quate.134 This remains true of the common law in general on
both sides of the Atlantic.135 If promising forms the basis of con-
tract law and doctrine, then the morality of promising would
131. It might be argued that Hohfeld would have had serious objections to the
incorporation of moral elements into this classificatory structure. Early in his
work, he sought to make a clear distinction between legal and nonlegal concep-
tions, though he never used the word "morality." See HOHFEID, FUNDAMENTAL
LECAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 24; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
132. See Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity,
and tlJe Second Restatement, 81 COl.UM. L. REV. 111 (1981) (setting out the morality-
efficiency debate among contract theorists and noting its reflection in the drafting
of the Restatement).
133. See, e.g., RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAl.YSIS OF LAW 118-26 (7th ed.
2007).
134. See 11 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CO!\TRACTS § 55.4 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 2005); 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 64.1 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2002); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970). For some empirical arguments
that courts nevertheless exhibit greater inclination to grant specific performance
than theory would suggest, see M.T. Van Heeke, Changing Emphases in Specific
Pelformance, 40 N.C. L REV. 1 (1961).
135. See GARETH JONES & WILLIAM GOODHART, SPECIFIC PERFORMAl CE 2 (2d ed.
1996); see also Andrew Phang, Specific Pelformance-Explorillg the Roots of 'Settled
Practice,' 61 MOD. L. REV. 421, 423 (1998) (noting that under English law the grant
of specific performance remains the exception, unlike in civil law jurisdictions).
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obviously require enforcement of the promise as the default
remedial measure upon a breach. 136 Yet, specific performance
remains the exception-hinting at the possibility of the law's
divergence from morality. The reason for this divergence has
baffled scholars for quite some time.
Utilitarians, of course, have made much of this. Most notable
is Justice Holmes's famous statement that the "confusion be-
tween legal and moral ideas" was manifest in the law of con-
tract and that "[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,-and nothing else."l37 This has since been developed
into the "efficient breach" theory of contractual remedies,
which is based on the argument that in situations where a
promisor's profits from a potential breach are in excess of the
promisee's loss from such breach, the breach should be encour-
aged (or at the very least, not deterred)-with no restraints
whatsoever imposed by morality. Btl Thus, the promisor is at all
times given the option of breaching, conditioned upon the pay-
ment of a penalty for the same, in the form of damages. Con-
tractual promises are protected, in this understanding, entirely
by liability rules. 139
The utilitarian account views contract as a subspecies of tort
law, where the law refrains from proscribing certain activities,
preferring instead to interfere at the back end in the interests of
corrective justice. In a similar vein, utilitarians argue that con-
tract law does not forbid (or even discourage) a breach, but pre-
fers to step in and award the injured party damages to make
136. SCI' Dori Kimel, Remedial Rights and SlIbstantive Rights in Contract Latu, 8
LEGAL TIII'ORY 313,320 (2002).
137. Oliver Wendell Holmes, )r., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897). Justice Holmes is even more vitriolic later in the same paragraph when he
notes, in the context of efficiency, that "such a mode of looking at the matter
stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into
the law as they can." Id.
ns. The phrase "efficient breach" was first coined by Charles Goetz and I~obert
Scott. Sec Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Da1l1ages, Pcnalties and the
{list COl11pellsatioll Principil': 501111' Notes on an Enforcc1l1ent Model alld a Theory of Effi-
cient Hrend1, 77 COLU]VI L. REV. 554 (1977). For elaborations both agreeing and
disagreeing with the theory, see POSi\:ER, supra note 133, at 119-20; Ian R. Macneil,
Efficient Breach of Contmct: Circles in thc Skl{, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); James P.
NehL COlltmct Oc71nages as Substitlltefor [1I11'PlTforllllll1ce, 32 IND. I.. Rrv. 765 (1999).
139 . .sec Anthonv 1. Kronman, Specific Pcrf(J1"IlltlllCl', 45 U. CHl. I. r~I-V. 351, 354
(J 97il) , ..
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good any 105S. 14U The recent move from traditions of subjective
intention to objective intention provides added strength to their
claims.I-l 1
The efficient breach argument has met with disagreement
from both utilitarians, who argue that specific performance is,
in general, more efficient than monetary relief, 142 and promis-
sory theorists, who attribute it to the vagaries of the common
law process and as an exception to the general rule. '43 Relying
on a Kantian approach to the role of morality in law, Charles
Fried, one of the most notable promissory theorists, argues:
Law can be, should be, but need not be a set of institutions
that underwrite, facilitate, and enforce the demands and as-
pirations of morality in our dealings with each other. It is
therefore entirely appropriate that various legal institutions
resemble the moral institutions which they partially instanti-
ate. Contract and promise are like that. 144
The attempt to explain this rather major anomaly away as a
menial exception may appear rather simplistic. Yet, in spite of
the nonavailability of specific performance in every easel prom-
ising continues to form the basis of contracting-both as a mat-
ter of law and practice. Contract doctrine continues to under-
stand itself in reference to the practice of promising and the
moral precepts that underlie it. 145 Contracts continue to be
made and performed by individuals, most of the time with lit-
tle regard for the consequences of the breach. 146
140. See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and
Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
141. For an overview of this change, see LARRY A. DIMAITEO, CONTRACT THE-
ORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL INTEl T (1998).
142. See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
For a more recent utilitarian criticism of the idea, see Richard R.W. Brooks, The
Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006).
143. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199
(1990).
144. Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F.
1, 3 (2007), http://www .harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/jan07/dried.pdf
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
145. See Linzer, supra note 132; see also supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
146. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HCMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § 5, at 519-
21 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1740) (noting that promises are human inven-
tions based on the "necessities and interests of society"); ROSCOE POUND, A IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 237 (1922) (characterizing promising as
a basic social and economic institution); see also 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) ("[T]he law of contracts
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Again! the internal point of view and the guidance function
of law provide an explanation for the apparent anomaly. By
employing the language of promising! contract law implicitly
exhibits a preference for performance over breach and the ideal
of pacta sunt servanda (lJpacts must be respected lJ )147 -a prefer-
ence that everyday practice deriving from ordinary social mo-
rality emphasizes. Since the function of contract law and its
underlying norms of promising is to guide behavior (as much
as, or perhaps more than! to guide judges), the absence of a di-
rect remedial enforcement of the ideal does not detract from its
centrality to the institution.
The analogy to contract law serves to highlight the role that
moral norms and extralegal ideas can play in structuring legal
doctrine. Much like the norm of inviolability in property law!
the norm of keeping one's promises (that is! pacta sunt servanda)
forms the foundation on which the rules of contract law are
structured -even if there remain points where its internaliza-
tion is incomplete. Rather than clouding doctrine in unintelli-
gible abstraction, these moral norms remain rooted in social
practice and are of great significance to understanding the op-
eration of the system, be it contract or property.
C. Toward a Pragmatic Conceptualism of Property
Quite apart from emphasizing the role of nonlegal (that is,
moral or social) norms in property law doctrine! using inviola-
bility as a defining principle directs attention to something far
more important: the role of conceptual thinking in compre-
hending the structural and functional attributes of property.
Conceptualism (or formalism), the attempt to understand and
analyze an institutional practice using its core concepts, has
over the decades received harsh criticism from scholars located
attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the
making of a promi~f . ... [IJt is believed to be the illain underlying purpose, and it
is believed that an understanding of many of the existing rules and a determina-
tion of their effectiveness require a lively consciousness of this underlying pur-
pose." (emphasis added)); L.L. Fuller & William K Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages: 7, 46 YIILE L.J. 52, 57 (1936) (noting how the law backs the
sense of injury that the "breach of a promise" engenders).
147 Sec Malcolm P. Sharp, Pacta 5/111t Scruamla, 4] COLUM. L. REV. 783 (194])
(describing tlw norm as deriving from the practical need for dependabilitv in
COJ1lmerciil! interilctions).
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in the realist or utilitarian tradition. II:-; Central to this criticism
has been the notion that legal ideas and institutions always ex-
ist in furtherance of some goal external to the law and that
consequently, a focus on law's concepts alone tends to be
overly myopic. 1-l9 This idea of conceptualism tends to view it as
a largely academic exercise-one with little to no practical in-
fluence at all. '511
Yet, legal concepts can be of significant functional relevance.
In analyzing tort law, Jules Coleman uses a method he terms
"pragmatism" in arguing that the meanings of concepts and
terms are central and need to be understood in relation to other
concepts and ideas (semantic non-atomism).'5l Most importantly
though, he argues that concepts need to be analyzed in terms of
the role they play in actual social practice (inferential role seman-
tics) and that an institution contains several concepts tied to-
gether through a general principle that is then at once both an
embodiment of the practice in which the concepts operate and
an explanation of it (explanation byembodiment).t:i2
Having set out this general method, Coleman then uses it to
analyze tort law and concludes that all of tort law can be un-
derstood through the principle of "corrective justice," and that
the law's core concepts in the area (that is, the duty of care,
proximate cause, and so on) nnd actual tort law practice both
148. See Ernest J. Wcinrib, Legal Formalism: On the [m/llanellt Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 950 (1988) ("Formalism is like a heresy driven underground, whose
tenets must be surmised from the derogatory comments of its detractors."). For a
historical account of formalism and its development in American legal thinking,
see Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Fonnatislll, 19 AM. J. LECAL HIST. 251
(1975).
149. See Weinrib, supra note 148, at 955.
150. Perhaps the most scathing attack on conceptualism in the first half of the
twentieth century came from Felix Cohen, who characterized it as a form of "tran-
scendental nonsense." See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). Cohen, however, seemed sympathetic to
Hohfeld's project, including it in the functionalist paradigm along with the ideas
of Holmes. See id. at 828. This likely ignores Hohfeld's primary-secondary distinc-
tion, where he sought to understand the former entirely outside the judicial para-
digm. See also Walter B. Kennedy, Functional NOllsense and the Trallscendental Ap-
proach, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 272 (1936) (offering a defense of conceptualism in
response to Cohen).
151. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINC]PLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRACMA-
T]ST ApPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 6-7 (2001).
152. Id. at 8.
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reflect the functioning of this principle.153 In the area of contract
law, others have adopted similar functional approaches to ana-
lyzing concepts. 1S4
Benjamin Zipursky terms this approach to conceptual analy-
sis pragmatic cOl1ceptualism. lss He further highlights a major ad-
vantage inherent in this strand of conceptualism: it offers a
"way of grasping th[e] domain of moves that in some sense are
built into the concepts of law."156 This form of conceptualism is
perfectly compatible with consequentialist analysis because it
allows for the possibility that purely consequentialist reasons
may have contributed to the development of the concept to be-
gin with. It remains equally compatible with ideas from moral-
ity and other extralegal influences grounded in social practice.
It is also directly responsive to Felix Cohen's call for functional-
ism, except that functionalism looks to institutionalized social
practice and not merely judicial decisions. lSi
A pragmatism of this conceptual variety has yet to make its
way fully into property law analysis. lss It is indeed plausible that
the fragmentation of property doctrine has contributed to this.
This fragmentation is the result of different property-constitutive
doctrines being classified as elements of either tort or contract
law and analyzed under the guiding principles of those areas
(such as corrective justice or utilitarianism), where they fit most
153. fd. at 10; see also Jody S. Kraus, Transparf'11cy and Determinacy ill Common Law
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV.
287,315 (2007).
154. See, e.g., STEPHEN A SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004).
155. Benjamin C Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000).
Zipursky notes: "[T]o understand the concepts and principles within an area of
the law is to grasp from within the practices of the law the pattern of verbal and
practical inferences that constitute the relevant area of the law." Jd. at 473. Jeremy
Waldron offers a similar account of the role of concepts that he terms "systematic-
ity." See Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental lonsense" and System in the Law, 100
COLUM. L REV. ] 6, 25 (2000) ("The rules in which [theoretical terms] appear fit
together in complex interconnection, not as coordinate purposive rules in a coher-
ent array of purposes but as interlocking parts of different shape, each contribut-
ing a particular functional component to an overall integrated picture.").
]56. Zipursky, sllpm note ]55, at 475.
157 See Cohen, supra note] 50, at 829-34.
158. A major exception to this trend is the work of Merrill and Smith, most no-
tably in their analysis uf the doctrine of numerus clausus in terms of the informa-
tion burdens it places on participants in the property system. SCI' Thomas V·./
Merrill & Henry L Smith, Opti11111l Stlll1darriizlJtiol1 in the Law of Property: The Nu-
merus CliJl1sUS Prillciple, 110 YAl.E L]. 1 (2000).
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uneasilyY'CJ Identifying a unifying principle in property would
go a long way in remedying this by introducing a minimal level
of consistency into all property-related discourse.
The previous analysis of inviolability-a functional attrib-
ute-and its connection to the idea of the right to exclude, fits
perfectly within the skein of pragmatic conceptualism. The
right to exclude remains a conceptual tool that finds a place' in
both property practice and doctrine, with inviolability operat-
ing as an explanatory principle. The right to exclude, centered
around inviolability, explains not just how courts construct an
owner's legal entitlements, but also how individuals under-
stand the institution of property as constraining their actions
and, at times, imposing affirmative obligations.
Conceptual analysis of property doctrine along these lines is
likely to be beneficial across a broad spectrum of areas, with it
becoming increaSingly common to transplant property ideas
and concepts from one context to another for instrumental
purposes. 160 Grounding the right to exclude in the principle of
inviolability and seeking its meaning in the duty it casts on oth-
ers remains a modest first step in that direction.
III. THE REMEDIAL VARIA T: EXCLUSIONARY
RELIEF AS A RIGHT
As noted earlier, it remains common in modern times to
equate the right to exclude with an entitlement to exclusionary
or injunctive relief. This approach is largely functional and de-
veloped from the realist idea that it is meaningless to speak of a
right in the absence of a remedy capable of enforcing it. 161
159. Two obvious examples of this fragmentation are: (1) the tort of trespass (to
realty and chattels), where tort law's corrective and distributive justice justifica-
tions have little explanatory force, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law
Property Metaphors on the Internet: The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertres-
pass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265,274 (2006), and (2) the enforcement
of contracts relating to the sale of land and identifiable goods, where in contrast to
other forms of contract, courts readily award specific performance, even in the
absence of an obvious efficiency gain, see Kronman, supra note 139, at 355; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECO D) OF TORTS §§ 158, 217 (2007).
160. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 159, at 331-33.
161. As Karl Llewellyn, a well-known realist scholar, noted, "[A] right is best
measured by effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of rem-
edy is defect of right." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW
AND ITS STUDY 94 (1960).
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Pragmatic as it may seem, this view tends to gloss over numer-
ous subtleties inherent in the idea of the exclusionary remedy.
Almost all of these subtleties derive from the nature of injunc-
tive relief as an equitable remedy. Since its inception, equitable
relief has been considered subject to an independent set of doc-
trinal constraints, all of which result in it being characterized as
an "extraordinary remedy" by courts. Talk of a right to exclu-
sionary relief tends to ignore the unique role of equity in this
conception of the right. What does it really mean, then, to
speak of a right to an exclusionary remedy?
It was precisely this question that the Supreme Court took
up in eBay.162 This Part focuses on the equitable remedy concep-
tion of the right to exclude, examining the interface between
equity and the rights discourse in the context of real and intan-
gible property, and then attempts to use this analysis to under-
stand the eBay holding and its aftermath.
Part IIl.A begins with an overview of the re:;nedial concep-
tion of the right to injunctive relief, and concludes that the ref-
erence to a right here is little more than an expectation of a spe-
cific outcome given the nature of the subject matter involved:
property rights. The conversion of a routine grant into a grant
as of right was largely a rhetorical device. Part IILB then ana-
lyzes eBay and the Court's rejection of the routine-grant version
of the right to injunctive relief.
The Court in eBay certainly was not presented with the invio-
lability-based (claim-right) conception of the right to exclude.
Yet, its holding alludes to the possibility that this is indeed
what the right has meant all along. Critics who fault the hold-
ing tend to ignore altogether the conceptualist construction of
the right and the possibility of the Court implicitly endorsing it.
A. The Traditiol1al Test and the Right to an Injunction
An injunction is best defined as "an order of the court direct-
ing a party to the proceedings to do or refrain from doing a
specified act."163 As a form of relief, the injunction is a preven-
tive rather than restorative remedy;lM and being equitable in
nature, the injunction is rooted in the distinction between eq-
162. eBil)' lnc v. MercFxchilnge, L.L.C, 1265. Ct. 1837 (2006).
163. R. MFC,\RRY & P B/\RKER, Si':F1I'S PI~I"JClPLESOF EQUITY 624 (27th ed. 1973)
1h4. WILJIi\\l WIIllNvlS0N KERR, A TI~Einl'iE ON THf:~ LAW AND PRACTICE OF h-
IUNCTIOi\:S 1 (John Melvin Patt'rson ed., .::;th ed. 1914).
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uity and common law. As a historical matter, equity developed
to alleviate the rigidity and inadequacy of the common law's
system of remedies. 165 Consequently, establishing the inade-
quacy of ordinary common law remedies became a necessary
precondition to the grant of equitable relief. Though its. con-
tours have varied over time, the "rule of inadequacy" remains
an integral part of equitable doctrine. 166 In an indirect way,
however, the rule of inadequacy worked to establish an im-
plicit hierarchy in remedial forms: courts (and plaintiffs) were
mandated to look to ordinary (common law) remedies in the
first instance, and only after courts were able to establish that
such remedies were either of little use or had been exhausted
would they consider the grant of an extraordinary (equitable)
remedy.167 To even consider the option of injunctive relief,
courts thus had to be convinced of the inadequacy of the de-
fault remedy-compensatory damages.
The rule of inadequacy eventually gave rise to a requirement
of irreparability.168 Under this formulation, plaintiffs had to es-
tablish that ordinary remedies were inadequate because the
harm to be prevented was irreparable through ordinary com-
pensation. Termed the irreparable injury rule, it is today asso-
ciated with an inability (for whatever reason) to quantify the
damage sought to be prevented. WI While scholars often use the
inadequacy and irreparability rules as synonyms, some formu-
lations tend to list them as independent factors that need to be
satisfied separately, though it is far from obvious that the con-
tent needed to satisfy each of them differs significantlyYo
165. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMEJ TARIES ON EQuITY JuRISPRUDENCE, AS ADMIN-
ISTERED IN ENCLAND AND AMERICA § 33 (1836).
166. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 999-1000
(1965).
167. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1 (1978).
168. See DAN B. DOBBS, HA DBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTiON § 2.1 (1973). For more on the inadequacy rule, see Doug
Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA.
L. REV. 346, 346 (1981); Developments in the Law, supra note 166, at 1002.
169. For more on the irreparable injury rule, see Douglas Laycock, The Death of
the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990). See also Doug Rendleman,
Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1642 (1992). For a more recent
analysis of the doctrine, arguing that it represents somewhat of an asymmetry, see
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 106 YALE L.J. 1284 (2007).
170. For a comprehensive historical analysis of the inadequacy rule, conclud-
ing that historically, the Chancery Court did not have to adhere to it in copy-
right cases, see Tomas G6mez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copy-
No.2] 64]
Although the rules of inadequacy and irreparability require
the plaintiff to establish a need for exclusionary relief, they
never directly take into consideration the interests of anyone
else-most notably, the defendant. In due course, therefore,
courts developed the doctrine of "relative hardship," or "bal-
ancing of the equities." In simple terms, this rule prevents a
court from granting a plaintiff injunctive (equitable) relief
when "the cost to the defendant of obeying the injunction is
substantially greater than the objective benefit to the plaintiff"
from the same. l7l The rule thus forces courts to examine the
individual circumstances of the parties before it, prior to
granting relief. 172
Once the rules of inadequacy, irreparability, and relative
hardship are satisfied, courts are then required to ensure that
the grant of the injunction would not run contrary to the public
interest. The public interest requirement is a catch-all category
that enables courts to factor in considerations that might ordi-
narily have been deemed extraneous to the dispute between
the parties - such as whether the issuance of the injunction
would impose costs on society as a whole, or whether it would
defeat the purposes of the law. ITl
Together, these four rules-inadequacy, irreparability, rela-
tive hardship, and public interest considerations-constitute
the traditional "four-factor" test for the grant of an injunction,
which courts are obligated to apply. As is apparent, the test
gives courts a significant amount of discretion in individual
cases. 174 Indeed, the element of discretion (driven by the need
for flexibility) has long been considered the defining feature of
equity as a whole.175 Quite apart from these injunction-specific
right Injunctions and the Inadequate-RelJ1edy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
171. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., ote, In;ll11ction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral,
1lI1d Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1563, 1577 (1975).
172. See generally W. Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equi-
ties," ]8 TEX. L. REV. 412 (1939); John Leland Mechem, ne Peasant in His Cottage: 501711'
Comments on the Relative Hardship Doctrine in Equity, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 139 (1955).
173. BI/t see Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injullctions and the PI/blie Interest, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. EEV. 382,419 (1983).
174. Indeed, some argue that this discretion is difficult to reconcile with the
terms of the test. Sf!! DOUCI.AS L.A YCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRl,EPARABLE INJL;RY
RULE (19<)]).
175. Sec generally Rosene Pound, The DeClldencc of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. l\Ev 20,22
(1905)
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rules l the rules of equity grant courts broad authority to factor
in a host of other considerations in deciding whether or not to
grant equitable relief. These other considerations are referred to
generically as I'equi table considera tions." Doctrines such as
"clean hands/I in pari delicto l and laches have long formed the ba-
sic building blocks of courts' equitable jurisdiction. 176 Given that
the grant of relief is discretionarYI the crucial question is whether it
becomes credible to speak of a right to injunctive relief.
In spite of their adherence to these four rules in other con-
texts l courts have tended to exhibit a general predisposition
towards granting injunctive relief in relation to property rights.
Deriving from the maxim that "equity protects property rights l
not personal rights/I courts began recognizing that they were
I'bound to protecf l property rights and focused their attention
on whether or not a right in question could be legitimately clas-
sified as proprietary. 177 In focusing on this classificatory question
(albeit with significant inconsistencies in their final determina-
tions), courts operated on the assumption that legal (common
law) remedies were inadequate to protect property rights and
that injunctive relief was therefore often a fait accompli. It was not
until much later that courts moved away from the property-
personal distinction as the main focus of their inquiry. 1711
Equiti s historical preference for property over personal
rights is itself the subject of some controversy. Some attribute it
to a misinterpretation of historical precedentl79 while others
argue that it arose as a consequence of equitis use of property
rights to establish its jurisdiction in situations where it other-
wise would not have had any. ISO Yet, almost everyone charac-
terized the distinction as being artificial and often resulting in
176. These concepts are collectively referred to as the "maxims of equity." Sec
CHARLES NEAL BARNEY, EQliITY AND [TS REMEDIES 39 (1915) ("Underlying the
doctrines of equity and at the basis of this system of jurisprudence are certain
general principles called maxims."); Roscoe Pound, The Maxims of Equity--l: Of
Maxims Generally, 34 HARV. L. REV. 809 (1921).
177. See Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch.); Development::; ill the
Law, supra note 166, at 998.
178. Developments in the Law, supra note 166, at 100l.
179. W.B.G., Note and Comment, A Re-Interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard, 25
MICH. L. REV. 889, 890 (1927).
180. Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YAl.E L.J.
115,132 (1923).
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an abjectly unjust denial of relief.l~l Soon enough, the distinc-
tion was done away with, but ever since, equity's connection to
property has been considered somewhat special.
Even after the property-personal distinction became diluted,
the argument that property rights necessitated injunctive relief
remained, deriving its force from the obvious inadequacy of
damages as a preventive-deterrent mechanism. Central to this
argument was the notion that if damages were to be the only
(or even the primary) form of relief, in a majority of cases one
private individual would effectively be allowed to take the re-
sources of another without the latter's consent-a form of pri-
vate taking. 182
Whereas the grant of equitable relief (of any kind) had long
been considered a matter "of grace," by the nineteenth century,
courts had begun to expressly repudiate this rule and replace it
instead with a rule that injunctions would issue "of right"
whenever property rights were at issue. IS1 What this meant was
merely that the discretion to grant was being replaced with a
discretion to deny - with the onus now on courts to justify their
decisions refusing relief rather than granting it. Invariably, this
derived from the "balancing of equities" part of the test. 184
When property rights were involved, courts deemed the ir-
reparability and inadequacy components satisfied; implicit in
that determination was the belief that property's element of ex-
clusion could be protected only through injunctive relief. This
approach became most apparent in the contexts of real prop-
erty trespasses and patent infringement, and remains dominant
even today.
18"1. Sec, e.g., Roscoe Pound, ElJlIitnblt, ReliefAgnin~t Dl:{nmntion nnd Injllries 10 Per-
sonnlihj, 29 HAI~V. L. REV. 640, 641 (1916).
182. 5 JOlIN NORTON POMEROY, EQuITY JCRISPRUDENCE AND [QUITABLE REME-
DIES § 1944 (2d ed. 19]9); T-Ienry L. McClintock, Discretion to Dcny Injllnction
Against Trespas.s and 1 lIisnnce, 12 Ml N. L REV. 565, 572 (]928).
183 See. ('g, Walters v. McElroy, 25 A 125, ]27 (Pa. 1892) ("The phrase 'of
grace' ... has no rightful place in the jurisprudence of a free commonwealth, and
ought to be relegated to the age in which it was appropriate."); sec also Hulbert v.
Cal. Portland Cement Co., 118 P. 928, 93] (Cal. 19] 1); Currie \' Silvernail", ] 71
'.W. 782,784 ( iJinn. ]919).
184 McClintock, ~lIl'm note 182, at 569
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1. Real Property: Injunctions [~estraining Acts of Trespass
Historically, courts were reluctant to grant injunctions pre-
venting trespasses unless an element of waste was involved. IRs
In due course, however, the waste-trespass distinction (in the
context of injunctive relief) came to be repudiated and courts
came to recognize that injunctions would issue "in aid of the
legal [property] right."186 The focus thus shifted to determining
whether the right asserted was in fact legitimate-that is,
whether the person claiming title or ownership did in fact have
ti tIe over the land in question. 18?
Equity also developed a rule that distinguished between na-
ked and destructive trespasses, based on the imminence of ir-
reparable damage to the land in question.188 In due course,
however, the irreparable damage element became linked to the
vitality of the plaintiff's legal right. Thus, courts came to recog-
nize that trespassory interferences could be legitimately re-
strained even when the damage was not necessarily significant
physically or monetarily, a possible allusion to normative
damages (captured by the injury-damage distinction, or the
rule of injuria sine damno- "legal injury without actual dam-
age" UN). Kerr thus notes that "[a]n act of trespass, not in itself
amounting to serious damage, may from its continuance,
amount in the opinion of the Court to trespass attended by ir-
reparable damage," and that situations could exist "where
185. JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF I JUNCfIONS, AS ADMINISTERED I
THE LAWS OF THE U ITED STATES AND ENGLAND 254 (1874); Note, Injunctions
Against Continuing or Permanent Injury to Real Property, 24 VA. L. REV. 786, 786 (1938).
186. FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 345 (3d ed. 1874).
187. Courts thus developed the distinction between trespasses by strangers to
the property and trespasses by those acting under color of right. Ironically
though, the law favored the grant of injunctive relief in the case of the latter and
not the former. See v.c. Kindersley's Court: Lowndes vs. BettIe, 13 AMER. L. REG.
169, 170 (1865) (reporting the decisions in Lowndes v. Bettie, (1864) 33 L.}. Ch. 451,
where the distinction was described most lucidly); see also William Draper Lewis,
Iniunctions Against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plaintiff to Establish his Right
at Law, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 289 (1908).
188. See WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE 0 THE LAW AND PRACfICE OF
[r'JUNCTIONS 147--48 (Franklin S. Dickson ed., 3d ed. 1889).
189. See Samuel C. Wiel, Injunction Without Damage As lIlustrated by {/ Point in the
Law of Waters, 5 CAL L. REV. 199, 201 (1917) (noting how the rule transforms
something into a form of liability actionable per se).
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great damage may be done to property, though the actual
damage done by the trespass is nothing."19o
In relation to trespasses, therefore, courts began to focus on
assuring themselves of the plain tiff's legal right and a breach of
or interference with that right, whereupon they proceeded to
"interfere at once" and grant a perpetual injunction. l9l By con-
trast, where either the right or a breach of the right remained
doubtful, courts were reluctant to interfere and proceeded in-
stead to engage in a balancing of the equities. Where both (1)
the right and (2) its breach were proven, the issuance of an in-
junction became in a sense mechanical, as long as the issuance
of injunctive relief was not meaningless-that is, where the act
complained of had ended, such as where the trespass was iso-
lated. In such situations, the court's discretion came to be lim-
ited severely (to exceptional circumstances meriting a denial),
and the law came to recognize the plaintiff as being entitled to
the relief sought. The discretion to grant was transformed into
a discretion to deny in exceptional situations. As Kerr notes,
"[a]fter the establishment of his legal right and the fact of its
violation, a man is entitled as of course to a perpetual injunc-
tion to restrain the recurrence of the wrong, unless there be
something special in the circumstance of the case."192
Following from this, once the a priori right to exclude and an
interference with it were established, it soon became legitimate
to speak of an injunction issuing as of right. 193 While scholars
190. KERR, slIprn note 188, at 149.
191. See Lowndes v. BettIe, (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. 451.
192. KEI~R, slIpra note 188, at 188.
193. For some recent instances where courts identify the grant of injunctive re-
lief as the default norm, evidencing a move to the "discretion to deny" formula-
tion, see: Amaral v. Cuppels, 831 N.E.2d 915, 920 n.l0 (Mass. App. Ct 2005) (iden-
tifying injunctive relief as the "appropriate remedy" when a repeated trespass
occurs and recognizing that "exceptional circumstances" might merit the denial of
such relief); Shapiro Bros., Inc. v. Jones-Festus Props., L.L.c., 205 S.W.3d 270, 278-
79 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (identifying injunctions as the "proper remedy" whenever
a harassing, continuing, and annoying trespass is involved); Warm v. State, 764
!Y.S.2d 483, 486 (App. Div. 2003) (identifying injunctive relief as a proper rem-
edy, but noting that "equity may withhold the use of such discretionary authority
if \·varranted by the circumstances"); Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421, 424 (N.C. Cl.
App. 2003) (identifying exclusion as a key component of ownership and injunc-
tive relief as the "usual remedy" for a continuing trespass); Aguilar v. Morales,
162 S.VV.3d 825, 836 (Tex. App. 2005) (identifying an injunction as the "proper
remedy" for a repeated and continuing trespass). The operative presumption in
all of these cases is that since the interferelll'c is continuing, damages-which are
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have tended to equate rights with entitlements as of right in
other contexts, Ill.! it bears emphasizing that the right here al-
ways remained discretionary. Courts never abdicated their dis-
cretion, but merely came to limit it to exceptional circum-
stances. Perhaps the most well-recognized "exceptional
circumstance" where courts still routinely deny injunctive re-
lief is that of good faith improvers (innocent encroachments). 195
In situations where the owner of an adjacent property mistak-
enly builds a structure on the property of his neighbor, courts
usually prefer damages to having him destroy the structure.
This preference for damages recognizes the burden and waste
the destruction is likely to cause. 196 As is to be expected, the in-
nocent encroachment exception is limited to mistaken im-
provements and has no application to intentional or "bad faith"
encroachments. 197
All of this is in contrast with the rule that was at issue in
eBay, where the exceptional circumstances limitation had be-
come redundant with the right being in a sense absolute and
courts devoid of discretion to deny.
by their nature one time, or would alternatively require multiple actions-are
intrinsically inadequate, making injunctive relief the default. See also 42 AM. JUR.
20 Injunctions § 110 (2007) ("Generally, an injunction will lie to restrain repeated
trespasses so as to prevent irreparable injury and a multiplicity of suits. Indeed, it
has been held that even the threat of continuous trespass entitles a party to injunc-
tive relief." (emphasis added)); 43A CJS Injunctions § 138 (2007) ("The general
rule permits injunctive relief for repeated or continuing trespasses, even in cases
where the damage is nominal and no single trespass causes irreparable injury.");
JAMES C SMITH & JACQUELli\:E P. HA0jO, NEIGHBORINC PRO['ERTY OWNERS § 3.13
(2007).
194. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE or: RIGHTS 3 (1990).
195. See JESSE DUKFM[NIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 135 (6th ed. 2006);
MERRILL & SMITII, supra note 108, at 50-56; Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improv-
ers of Real Estate, 64 N.C L. REV. 37 (1985); John Henry Merryman, Improving the
Lot of the Trespassing llllpruuer, 11 STAN. L. REV. 456 (1959).
196. See, e.g., Nebel v. Guyer, 221 P.2d 337 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Golden
Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 F.2d 592 (Colo. 1951); Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258
(N.J. 1969); Goldbacher v. Eggers, 76 .y.s. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Owenson v. Brad-
ley, 197 N.W. 885 (N.D. 1924). Massachusetts remains an exception to this trend,
refusing to recognize innocent improvements as an "exceptional circumstance."
See Brink v. Summers, 227 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1967); Beaudoin v. Sinodinos, 48
N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1943).
197. See DUKEMII ·IER & KRIER, supra note 195, at ]53; MERRII.L & SMITH, supra
note 108, at 55.
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2. Injunctions Restraining Patent Infringement
Intangible rights such as patents and copyrights remain dif-
ferent from other forms of property in more respects than one.
Yet, here too we see the idea of exclusion forming the core
around which the proprietary significance of the rights re-
volves. The law relating to patent injunchons was directly at
issue in eBay.
A patent grants its holder a set of exclusive rights in relation
to a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement" of the
same. 19R More importantly, though, a patent's functionality is
understood in terms of the right to exclude. Once granted, a
patent gives its holder the "right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention" in queshon.199
In most claims for patent infringement, two issues are almost
always in play: the vnlidity of the patent grant, and the fact of
infringement. The former involves determining whether the
administrative agency issuing the patent adhered to the condi-
hons for the grant: novelty, uhlity, and non-obviousness. The
latter entails proving that the defendant performed one or
more of the activities that the patent holder is granted an enti-
tlement to perform exclusively. Once both validity and in-
fringement are established, the court then proceeds to the issue
of remedies, where injunctive relief remains the most popular.
Courts inihally applied the irreparability and inadequacy cri-
teria with significant regularity. In due course, however, the
realization emerged that, in situahons where an infringement
did in fact exist (and was conhnuing), denying the holder an
injunchon was tantamount to rendering the patent's grant of
exclusivity meaningless. 2on Irreparability and inadequacy thus
came to be presun1ed as a matter of course each time a valid
patent was proven to have been infringed. Even though the
traditional test remained in place, in practice, when "the right
198.35 U.s.c. §101 (200:=;).
199. hI. § 154(a)(1) (emphasis added).
200.5('(' 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMF.J\rJ ARIES 0" EQUITY Jl;RISPI,UXNCE As ADMl
ISnRm II\: F: CLA\!D Al\:n At-...'!f:RICA 612 (W.H. Lvon, Jr ed, 14th ed. 1918) (1836)
("It is quitc plain that if nil otlwr remedy could 'be givcn in cases of patents and
copyrights than an Jction at JelW lor damages, the inventor or author might be
ruined by the necessitv llf perpetual litigation, without E'ver being able III have a
finall'stablishment \)f his rights.").
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[was] well established and the violation clear, neither consid-
erations of public or private convenience, or hardship to the
defendant, [prevented1 the court from interfering.// 201 Once va-
lidity and infringement were established, the norm thus be-
came that a court '/ may interfere at once and grant an injunc-
tion."202 All of this arose from the rather obvious inadequacy of
damages to prevent further acts of infringement.
In this way, equity came to treat intellectual property analo-
gously to real property. Once title (validity) and trespass (in-
fringement) were established, the grant of injunctive relief
seemed to follow naturally. Here too, however, courts never
openly eliminated their discretion except to admit to exclusion-
ary relief becoming the default option. The frequency with
which this occurred created an expectation among plaintiffs
(patent holders) that injunctive relief would always follow (once
validity and infringement were no longer in issue), notwith-
standing the traditional test and the vestige of judicial discretion.
Over time, courts of equity thus began to limit their remedial
discretion by presuming elements of the traditional (four-
factor) test to be satisfied whenever a valid property right was
at issue and was shown to have been interfered with. What was
initially discretion to grant was transformed into discretion to
deny. Yet, the discretion always remained - however minimal it
may have been. The right to injunctive relief (as a variant of the
owner's right to exclude) is then, at best, a strongly conditional
right. Property holders legitimately came to expect that when
their valid interest was interfered with, courts would, with few
exceptions, find the issuance of an injunction unproblematic.
It must be emphasized that even in situations where they
readily came to limit their discretion and recognize that injunc-
tive relief was the necessary, natural, or proper remedy, courts
do not seem to have ever considered themselves legally bound
to grant the injunction.
If the right to exclude truly entailed no more than this discre-
tion-laden entitlement to injunctive relief, one might be justified
in characterizing property law's emphasis on it to be misplaced.
Yet, in eBay, the Court was confronted with a significantly
201. High, supra note 185, at 349; see also CHARLES STEW ART DREWRY, A TREATISE
o THE LAW AI 'D PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 220,223-24 (1841).
202. Kerr, supra note 188, at 296-97.
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stronger version of the rule, one that effectively eliminated all
remedial discretion.
B. Unlinking Right and Remedy: Understanding eBay
It remains possible to envisage an even stronger variant of the
rule favoring the grant of injunctive relief for property viola-
tions. This would involve eliminating any possible discretion to
deny the injunction, making the grant fully automatic once title
and interference are established. This approach wou ld involve
abandoning altogether the idea of discretionary remedialism
that once formed the central feature of equitable remedies.
Discretionary remedialism is the view that courts have the
discretion to award plaintiffs an /I appropriate remedy" in an
individual case and are not necessarily limited to specific kinds
of remedies within any category.203 To be sure, it comes in dif-
ferent forms and flavors, but the idea of discretion is central to
its conception.204 Critics of discretionary remedialism argue
that it becomes problematic to speak of rights (in the remedial
sense) if discretion of any kind persists as an element of the
remedial discourse. They, in turn, prefer a strict rule-based ap-
proach to the discretionary one.20S
It was precisely this conflict-between a discretionary ap-
proach and a rule-based one-that the Court encountered in
the context of the automatic injunction rule in eBay. Since its
inception, the Federal Circuit had developed a general rule in
the context of patent injunctions, under which courts granted
plaintiffs a permanent injunction once validity and infringe-
ment were factually proven. 20r, As a direct consequence, the
right to exclude-statutorily delineated as the central element
203. Simon Evans, Defending DiscretionalY Remedialism, 23 SY1Y\EY L. REV. 463,
463 (2001).
204. See Paul Finn, [quitable Doctrinc and Discretion in Rt!medies, in RrSTITUTlON:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTI.':RE 251 (W.R. Cornish et a1. eds., 1998); Darrvn M. Jensen,
TI1C Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary RCl1ledialism, 2003 SIf\:C. J. U:CAL STUD. 178;
Patricia l.oughlan, No Right to the Remt!dy?: An Analysis of Judicial Discretion in the
Imposition of Eqllitable Remedies, 17 MEI.I3. U. L. REV. 132 (1989); David Wright
Wrong and Remedy: A Sticky Relationship, 2001 SINC.]. treAL STUD. 300.
205. Peter Birks is perhaps the most outspoken critic of discretionary remcdial-
ism. See Peter Birks, Three Kinds or Olwetion to Discrclionary RemedialiSIII, 29 W.
AusT. L. REV. 1 (2000).
206. See Craig S. Summers, Remedies .tor Patent Infrlngemenl in tlie Frderol Cir-
(llil -A S,ir<WY of the Firsl Six Yellrs, 29 IDEA 333, 337 (]988) ("Once infringement
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in a patent grant-came to be equated with a plaintiff's auto-
matic entitlement to injunctive relief in infringement actions. In
eBay, the Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit's rule.
1. The Automatic Injunction Rule
A few years after its establishment in 1982, the Federal Cir-
cuit formulated a general rule that in suits for patent infringe-
ment a permanent injunction would automatically issue upon
a finding that the patent was infringed and that it was not inva-
lid.207 Although in formulating its rule the court had retained
an exceptional circumstances limitation-perhaps in recogni-
tion of the discretion to deny formulation - in practice, it had
interpreted the limitation as applicable only when public
health or safety were at issue. 208 Given the court's general reluc-
tance to invoke the exceptional circumstances rule, the issu-
ance of injunctions came to be recognized as mechanical once
infringement and validity were proven. 209 In so doing, the
Federal Circuit had also explicitly refused to apply the tradi-
tional four-factor test in its standard formulation. The court's
rationale, in simple terms, relied upon the preeminence of the
right to exclude within the set of rights granted to the pat-
entee. In one of its early cases, the court noted that without
an injunction, the patentee's right to exclude would be dimin-
ished, the owner would lack leverage, and the patent would
have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have.2IO
Under this understanding, a refusal to grant an injunction in a
situation where validity and infringement had been affirma-
207. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established pursuant to
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. For a
discussion of the tension between eBay and the general rule established by the
Federal Circuit, see George M. Sirilla, William P. Atkins & Stephanie F. Goeller,
Will eBay Bring Down the Curtain on Automatic Injunctions in Patent Cases?, 15 FED.
OR. B.]. 587 (2005).
208. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 61 F. App'x 680, 685 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("The important public needs that would justify the unusual step of denying in-
junctive relief, however, have typically been related to public health and safety.");
Ritl'-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547-48 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing in-
stances where the exception had previously been invoked).
209. See David B. Conrad, Note, Mining the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's
Rejectiun of the Automatic Injunction Rille In eBay v. MercExchange, 26 REV. LITle.
119,121 (2007).
21 0 See Smith Inn, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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tively established without question would amount to a denial
of the basic right to exclude. 211
In laying down this rule, the Federal Circuit adopted a rather
counterintuitive interpretation of the patent statute, which pro-
vides that "courts having jurisdiction of [patent] cases ... may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent."212 The
automatic rule mandating the grant seemingly disregarded
the unequivocally discretionary language used by Congress.
It is therefore not surprising that, in 2005, a legislative effort
was mounted to remedy this anomaly by requiring courts to
apply the four-factor test in patent cases. 213 The automatic rule
articulated by the Federal Circuit thus concretized the connec-
tion between property and injunctive relief through the right
to exclude.
Although the Supreme Court, before eBay, had never directly
considered the automatic rule, nearly a century ago it did ex-
pound on the philosophy behind injunctive relief in patent
cases. In so doing, it seemed to both endorse the rule and at-
tribute its primacy to a patent's conferral of the right to ex-
clude. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,2l4 the
defendant questioned the court's authority to issue an injunc-
tion when the patent had not been put to use, even though va-
lidity and infringement had been affirmatively established. Al-
though the Court did not rule on the automatic injunction rule,
it went on to observe:
From the character of the right of the patentee we may
judge of his remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that
the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a
prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes
211. See, e.g., I~ichardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246---47 (Fed. Cir.
] 989) ("Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of prop-
erty, of which the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude
others from use of his property."); \N.L Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d
1275, ]28] (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[A]n injunction should issue once infringement has
been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it.").
212 35 USC § 283 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Roche Prods., Inc. v Bolar
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. ]984) (emphasizing that section 283 made
the issuance of an injunction discretionary).
213. This was part of the Patent I\cform Act of 2005, H.R 2795, 109th Congo
(2005). See Sirilla, Atkins & Goeller, sllpra note 207, at 588-89 n.5. The legislation
was eventually unsuccessful.
214 2]0 U.s. 405 (1908).
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away the privilege which the law confers upon the pat-
entee.... Whether, however, ... in view of the public inter-
est, a court of equity might be justified in withholding relief
by injunction, we do not decide. 215
The Court's use of the terms "right" and "prevention" makes
clear that it is, indeed, referencing the right to exclude. The
privilege to which the Court refers is that of exclusive use, part
of the patent grant that is shielded by the right to exclude.
What is also clear from the Court's analysis is the implicit rec-
ognition that any judicial discretion is only the discretion to
deny and not to grant, and that an injunction remains the default
remedy when the right to exclude (property) is involved.216 It is
the existence of this discretion to deny an injunction that the
Court seems unsure of, thereby implicitly endorsing the auto-
matic rule in the context of patent infringements.
2. The Supreme Court and the Automatic Injunction
In eBay, the plaintiff MercExchange brought an action against
the defendant, alleging infringement of its business method
patent. The defendant had sought to license the patent from the
plaintiff, but negotiations eventually broke down, and the
plaintiff ultimately sued in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.217 At trial, the jury found the
patent in suit to be valid and that the defendant had indeed
infringed it. The district court, however, denied the plaintiff's
motion for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant's
infringement, instead awarding damages. Applying the four-
factor test to the facts before it, the court concluded that dam-
ages provided the plaintiff with an adequate remedy and
would best serve the public interest.218 Much of the district
court's concern seems to have stemmed from three elements:
one, that the patent in question was a business-method patent,
the growing issuance of which had made the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) introduce an additional level of review
215. Td. at 430.
216. The Court additionally noted that "exclusion may be said to have been of
the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any
owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive." [d. at 429.
217. MercExchange, L.L.c. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (ED. Va. 2003).
218. [d. at 710-15.
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prior to issuance;219 two, that the plaintiff was not actually using
(working) the patent, but was merely seeking to license it;220 and
three, that the plaintiff had sought to license it to the defendant
and made public its intent merely to seek damages. 221
On appeal, the Federal Circuit characterized the district
court's concerns as unpersuasive. 222 Restating the general rule
that "courts 'will issue permanent injunctions against patent in-
fringement absent exceptional circumstances/' it reversed the
district court's decision.223 In so doing, it noted that injunctions
were not reserved for inventors who intended to practice their
inventions and that "the statutory right to exclude is equally
available to both groups, and the right to an adequate remedy to
enforce that right should be equally available to both as we11."224
The Supreme Court agreed to review the matter.22~
During oral argument before the Court, Justice Scalia seemed
most defensive of the Federal Circuit's approach. When the pe-
titioner sought to argue that equity had systematically rejected
the idea that relief might ensue categorically in particular cir-
cumstances, Justice Scalia retorted that this was not the case
with the use of someone else's property, noting that "we're
talking about a property right here ... the right to exclude oth-
ers ... [t]hat's what the patent right is. And all he's asking for
is 'give me my property back."'226 Later, in response to the gov-
ernment's intervention, Justice Scalia reemphasized the incon-
sistency between characterizing the right as a property right
and providing only for damages, noting that this conveyed the
message "[h]ere, take your money, and you ... go continue to
violate the patent."227
219. lei at 713-14.
220. lei. at 712.
221. lei at 712-13.
222. McrcExchimge, L.LC. v. cEay, Jill'., 401 F3dl323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
223. lei. (emphasis addL'd).
224. lei
225 eEay, lnc \'. McrcExchangc, l.LC, 546 US lO29 (2005) (granting certiorari
to hear the case)
226. Tnlllscript ()f Ore-Ii Argument at h. ('Ralfl 12b S. Ct lR37 (No. 05-130).
227. lei. at ::n




Yet, when the Court eventually handed down its decision, its
opinion side-stepped the property issue almost completely.m;
In three separate opinions (one for the Court and two concur-
rences), the Court reversed the Federal Circuit. 229 Without de-
ciding on the facts of the case before it, the majority opinion
merely reiterated that the grant (or refusal) of injunctive relief
was a matter of equitable discretion, and one that had to be
"exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity."2JO In
other words, the Court reaffirmed the centrality of the four-
factor test.
Chief Justice Roberts's short two-paragraph concurrence did
little more. While noting the difficulty inherent in "protecting a
right to exclude through monetary remedies," he nevertheless
concluded that this "does not entitle a patentee to a permanent
injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should
issue." 2J1 This categorical language seemingly eliminates both
variants of the automatic injunction rule discussed above-the
weaker variant (converting the discretion to grant into a mere
discretion to deny) and the stronger one (eliminating all discre-
tion). Surprisingly, however, the Chief Justice's concurring
opinion went on to draw a distinction between an exercise of
equitable discretion and writing on a clean slate, observing that
such discretion may indeed be limited by legal standards in
order to ensure consistency.232 This observation was presuma-
bly intended to set out the practical consequences of the
Court's elimination of the automatic injunction rule: that even
though the discretion does exist, to ensure consistency, it may
only be applied according to well-established standards that
result in consistent outcomes.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion added very little ex-
cept to note that historical practice may provide courts with
some guidance in the exercise of their discretion.233 It attempted
to identify the problems inherent in the automatic injunction
rule - particularly that an injunction would grant undue lever-
228. See Richard A. Epstein, The Structural Unitt/ of Real and Intellectual Property,
PROGRESS ON POINT, Release 13.24, Oct. 2006, at 5 (characterizing the opinion as
having made "complete intellectual hash" out of the balancing test).
229. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LL.C, 126 S Ct. 1837, 1841-43 (2006).
230. Id. at 1841.
231. ld. at 1841 (Roberts, c.J., concurring)
232. ld. at 1841-42.
233. lri. at 1842 (Kennedy, L concurring).
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age to companies merely interested in obtaining licensing
fees-that may be detrimental to the public interest.234
The Court was seemingly motivated by the need to curb the
practice of companies making their revenues by simply licens-
ing out inventions without actually working them - often re-
ferred to as "patent trolls." The petitioner made much of this
during oral argument235 and the Court seems to have been mo-
tivated by a similar concern, as Justice Kennedy's opinion
makes amply clear.236
Whether legitimate or not, the concern over patent trolls
ought to have been the subject of congressional intervention
rather than judicial concern. The statute in its current form spe-
cifically recognizes the possibility of such trolling and ex-
pressly disables courts from denying a party relief for the re-
fusal to license or use the patent in question.237 In taking the
matter into its own hands, the Court's opinion seemingly con-
tradicts the express language of the statute. Property rights al-
ways introduce the problem of holdouts, and when this remains
a genuine concern, legislative-not judicial-intervention can
alleviate the problem.238
Potentially even more significant is the difficulty in reconcil-
ing the Court's decision in eBay with its decision in Continental
Paper Bag. It is probably for this reason that the opinions make
almost no reference at all to that case, even though the Court
suo moto requested to be briefed on the matter and in fact heard
oral argument on the same. The single isolated reference to the
case is used to make the point that the district court's posi-
tion-denying the patentee an injunction categorically because
of its attempt to license the invention-was impermissible.239
The Court thus implicitly affirmed its prior position in Conti-
234. Jd. at ]842-43.
235. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, cBay, 126 S. CLI 837 (No. 05-] 30).
236. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237.35 USc. § 27] (d)(4) (2005); sec also Yee Wah Chin, Ullilaterni Tcc!J1/ology
Supprcssion. Appropriate Alltitrust IIlld Patcnt Law Remcdies, 66 ANT1TJ,UST L.J. 441
(1998); Mark A. Lemlev, Thc Economic lrrnti01/a/itlj of t!Jc Patellt lV1isuse Doctrillc, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1623--25 (1990). . .
238. For an overview of the holdout problem in the context of transaction cost
econon,ics, see Richard A. Epstein, f-Ioldouts, Externalities, iJlld t!Jc Sillgle Owner:
OI1C More Salute to ROllald COiJSC, 36 JL. & Eco!". 5'13 (1993).
239. eBtIl(, 126 5 Ct at 1840-41.
l1ental Paper Bag, even while its express holding remains irrec-
oncilable with it.
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3. The End of Automatic Injunctions: Intellectual Property
and Beyond
If there is one point that the Court's excessively narrow hold-
ing does affirmatively establish, it is that the automatic injunc-
tion rule for patents no longer exists. In its zeal to invalidate the
stronger version of the rule, however, the Court eliminated the
weaker version as well. The big question is whether its holding
applies beyond the realm of intellectual property, to tangible
property as well. 240
The Court's ruling now requires courts to apply the tradi-
tional four-factor test, even after the issues of validity and in-
fringement have been found for the plaintiff-patentee. Part of
the test requires the patentee to establish that "remedies avail-
able at law ... are inadequate to compensate" for the injury.241
The test is thus founded on the idea that, ordinarily, damages
(compensatory remedies) are the default option, and exclusion-
ary remedies (injunctive relief) are to be invoked only in ex-
traordinary circumstances. The weaker version of the auto-
matic injunction rule would have merely altered the default by,
in some sense, shifting the burden onto the defendant-infringer
240. In an amicus brief filed by fifty-two intellectual property law professors in
support of the petitioners' position in eBay, the argument was made that such a
hierarchy was well-established in the cases of real and chattel property as well. As
they observed:
Courts apply the traditional principles of equity to real and personal
property, and consider such factors as adequate remedy at law, the
balance of hardships to the parties, and the public interest in deciding
whether to grant an injunction.... Courts regularly award damages
rather than injunctive relief against invasion of real property when the
circumstances warrant.
Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners
at 4, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.c.c., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006
WL 1785363. For a foreword to the brief, published later, see Robert P. Merges,
Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 997 (2006).
[nterestingly, another brief filed by various law and economics professors in
support of the respondents' position points out that the above-stated position was
based on a misunderstanding and overreading of the law. See Brief of Various
Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10-11,
eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 639164.
241. eBatf, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
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to prove that injunctive relief was inappropriate in light of the
circumstances. The holding effectively reintroduces the ancient
remedial hierarchy that equity practice had come to dilute sig-
nificantly over the course of the last century or so, specifically
in relation to property rights.
Most importantly, the Court's holding is not restricted to the
domain of patent or, indeed, intellectual property law, and
would seemingly apply to automatic injunctions in the context
of tangible property as well. The logic of the Court's rejection
of the rule was the need to treat injunctive relief in the context
of patents on equal terms with injunctive relief in other con-
texts. The Court's observation that the traditional factors "ap-
ply with equal force" to patent disputes is aptly indicative of
the same.242 Additionally, and perhaps of more relevance, is
that in support of its holding that patent injunctions need to
follow the traditional test, the Court relied on two cases, nei-
ther of which had any connection whatsoever to patents or intel-
lectual property, but nonetheless did involve automatic injunc-
tions.243 Consequently, there remains good reason to believe
that the Court's holding applies to the entire gamut of auto-
matic injunctions, not just those related to patents.
Under this reading of eBay, the automatic injunction rule-in
both variants and in connection with both intellectual and tan-
gible property-stands abrogated. In its place, the traditional
four-factor test and the preference for damages to all other
remedies remains the norm.
4. Moving to Efficient Infringement (and Trespass?)
If the absence of a direct recourse to specific performance in
the context of contract law serves as doctrinal evidence of a
theory of efficient breach, does the eBay holding now signal a
move towards a normative theory of efficient trespass or in-
fringement in the context of property rights?
The four-factor test, with its emphasis on inadequacy and ir-
reparability, has long been understood as involving little more
242. JrI.
243. See in. The cases cited were Weinbcr,';er (). Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.s. 305 (1982),
which involved the issuance of an injunction to restrain water pollution, and
Amoct) Productiol/ Company (). Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987), which involved an in-
junction for noncompliance with a statute aimed at preserving lands in Alaska.
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than a cost-benefit analysis. 244 In situations where it is ineffi-
cient to coerce performance of the contract courts award dam-
ages. If this is precisely what the four-factor test entails, then
mandating a rigid adherence to it in the context of property
implies a similar emphasis on efficiency.
To be sure, the idea of IIefficient trespass" or "efficient con-
version" has been in existence for a long time, with some using
it as a logical extrapolation of the efficient breach theory to il-
lustrate the incompatibility of the theory with the idea of prop-
erty.245 This approach, however, tracks the remedial emphasis
on the right to exclude; as we have seen, the centrality of the
right to exclude does not derive from its actual enforcement.
Others have raised the idea of efficient trespass in the context
of other property doctrines (such as adverse possession),246 but
have stayed clear of offering a normative account of the theory,
given the general structure of equity practice before eBay.247
Even if one doubts that the Court's holding has implications
outside of intellectual property, within that context at least, it
certainly signals a move towards a doctrine of efficient trespass
of intangibles, or of efficient infringement.248 In situations
where the infringement of a patent (or other intellectual prop-
erty) right appears to have short- and possibly long-term effi-
ciency gains (especially in the social welfare sense), courts are
now not just allowed but actually mandated to avoid granting
244. See EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT El FORCEME T: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
AI D INJD CT[O S 41 (1989); see also Kronman, supra note 139, at 351; Thomas S.
Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Peljol"llzance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract
Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 366-67 (1984).
245. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, rill: Et.ficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
13-14 (1989) (speaking of "efficient appropriations" and "efficient theft"); Ian R.
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 963-64
(1982) (noting the efficient theft argument).
246. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient "L"respass: The Case for" Bad Faith" Adverse Pos-
session, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037 (2006).
247. fd. at 1081 n.l64 ("It bears emphasis that I am not advocating a generalized
normative theory of 'efficient theft.'''). Fur a more recent attempt, however, see
Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 20(8) (manuscript at 3) (arguing that courts
should look to the "costs and social v,llue" involved in obtaining additional in-
formation about property rights in choosing between property and liability rule
protection).
248. For more on this idea and its pros and cons, see Robert P. Merges, Of Prop-
crty Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994), and Julie
S. Turner, Comment, The Nonmanllfncturil/g Patent Owner: Toc:unrd n Theory of Effi-
cient Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1998).
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exclusionary relief. This is borne out most distinctively in the
Court's concern with patent trolls-entities that hold the right
without actually using it directly. Even though the statute ex-
plicitly recognizes the possibility of such activity and requires
cou rts to avoid factoring it into their decision on remedies,249
the Court thought it appropriate to incorporate the matter into
its standard analysis. Factoring in trolling is undoubtedly an
efficiency or utilitarian calculation, premised on the belief that
the public is somehow benefited by the actual working of a
patent (even if by an infringer), rather than its non-working.
The move from trolling in the intangible world to other ob-
vious utility-enhancing activities in the context of realty and
chattels is not really that difficult. Take the case of an absentee
landowner and a squatter (assuming of course, that the period
of limitation for adverse possession has not passed), or that of a
landowner who seeks to prevent someone (or the public) from
crossing his land for reasons that cannot be justified on eco-
nomic terms. 250 In each of these cases, the four-factor test would
presumably militate against the grant of injunctive relief. In
some areas of property doctrine, equity already recognizes just
such an efficiency calculation in its grant of relief-the most ob-
vious being that of unintentional building encroachments.2S1 Its
direct incorporation into the four-factor test, however, makes the
efficiency trade-off applicable to all property disputes.
eBny thus signals a clear move towards efficiency concerns
influencing the grant of injunctive relief in cases involving
property and intellectual property rights. The previous pre-
sumption that property rights were intrinsically efficiency en-
hancing, which, therefore, obviated the need for a secondary
249.35 USc. § 271(d) (2005) (" '0 patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal exknsion of the patent right by reason of his
having done one or more of the follovving: ... (4) refused to license or use any
rights to the patent ...."). Indeed, this affirmatively establishes the nonexistence
of a duty to lise the patented inventiun at all -a principle that even before codifi-
cation had been established in case law. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis &
Mark A. Lem]ev, Ul/ilnlt'1I7/ Refllsi1ls 10 1-i(t'llsl', 2 J COMPETIT10N 1.. & Eco '.1,2-3
(2006). .
250. Sec, e.g., Jacque v. Steen berg Humes, Inc., 563 I.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (in-
volving a lando\-\'Iwr who sought to pn'\'l'nt defendant from traversing unused
field to get to the other side, eVl'n though it was the shortest possible route and
would not have interfered with the owner's <letualuse).
251. 5,'c f\/!L'rrill & Smith, slipm nokl r:;8, at '14-55.
efficiency calculation at the time of their enforcement, no
longer holds true.
Regardless of whether eBay's formulation of equity'S test for
injunctions is consistent with the historical trend in the area,
the Court's holding does conclusively establish that the reme-
dial conception of the right to exclude is not what property en-
tails. Ironically, then, at the same time that the Court's holding
moves the law in the direction of a utilitarian approach to in-
junctive relief, it also rejects an exclusively consequentialist
understanding of the right to exclude. To be sure, the Court did
not hint at what an alternative conception of the right might
be-and perhaps with good reason.
Central to the ambivalence surrounding eBay is that patents
remain (by both structure and intent) a form of private prop-
erty built around the right to exclude. Yet, if this did not entail
exclusion by injunctive relief, it seemed futile, at first blush, to
continue emphasizing the centrality of exclusion. The inward-
looking conception of the right to exclude-deriving from in-
violability-provides a complete answer to this apparent dis-
connect. Viewed in this light, the Court in eBay might have im-
plicitly acknowledged the simple, yet often-overlooked reality
that property (and with it the right to exclude) is a meaningful
institution independent of its judicial enforcement.
660 Hl1ruard !oUrIll1l of Lm.u & Public Policy [Vol. 31
CONCLUSION
Taken at one time as axiomatic of what the idea of property
meant, the right to exclude has in recent times receded into the
background. While the antiformalism that has characterized
the modern property discourse has undoubtedly contributed to
this development,252 it is also the result of the insufficient atten-
tion that courts and scholars have paid to disaggregating the
idea and its meaning. Consequently, it has indeed become in-
creasingly common to characterize the idea as a "trope," or rhe-
torical epithet, devoid of functional relevance. 253
Although the Court's holding in eBay may be interpreted by
some as contributing to this move, this Article has argued that
eBay actually directs attention to what the right to exclude has
252. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2.
253. See, e.g., Rose, supra note I, at 604 (characterizing the right to exclude and
the "Exclusivity Axiom" as a trope).
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meant all along. Understanding the institution of property to
be grounded in the norms associated with the principle of in-
violability casts the right as nothing more than the correlative of
the duty to keep away from a resource over which the norm ap-
plies. This, in turn, focuses attention on the role of property (and
ownership) as a coordination device for scarce and rival re-
sources. Counterintuihvely, then, the Court's holding strength-
ens the normative significance of the idea.
The holding in eBny closed the door on but one conception of
the right- the remedial version. The automatic injunction rule
that the Court rejected had resulted in the right to exclude com-
ing to be understood as the right to exclusionary relief. Yet, just
as the absence of a right to specific enforcement is not consid-
ered indicative of the nonexistence of a contractual right to per-
formance, the absence of a right to exclusionary relief has simi-
larly little bearing on the centrality of exclusion to property.
The primary right conception of exclusion, much like the pri-
mary right conception of contractual performance, derives its
normative content from an underlying moral ideal on which
the institution of property bases itself: inviolability. Inviolabil-
ity represents a principle central to peaceful coordinated social
existence, and the right to exclude, as a correlative to the duties
that derive from it, converts it into a legal (as opposed to
moral) norm.
The right to exclude, then, remains the defining ideal of
property. If the idea of property is understood outside of its
remedial (or enforcement) context, and instead is viewed as a
social institution that coordinates access to and use of scarce
resources, the primary or correlative right conception begins to
make logical sense. Recasting the right to exclude along these
lines, it is hoped, will contribute towards moving property de-
bates away from their singular emphasis on remedialism and
towards a broader analvtical framework for the institution.
"
